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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 
1996: WHEN LEGISLATIVE REGULATION BECOMES UNCONSTITU­
TIONAL PUNISHMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1974, the United States Department of Justice brought a 
landmark antitrust suit against the American Telephone & Tele­
graph Company ("AT&T").1 It alleged that AT&T, or the Bell Sys­
tem, participated in a conspiracy to use its local service monopolies 
to disadvantage competitors in the long distance service and tele­
communications equipment markets.2 Eventually the case was set­
tled under terms that came to be known as the AT&T Consent 
Decree or Modified Final Judgment ("Consent Decree").3 The 
Consent Decree did not constitute evidence or an admission of the 
antitrust violations; however, it required AT&T to divest itself of 
twenty-two subsidiaries known as the Bell Operating Companies 
("BOCs").4 The BOCs were then grouped into seven regional Bell 
Operating Companies ("RBOCS").5 While the BOCs maintained 
1. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314,1317-18 (D.D.C. 1978) (alleging 
violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by AT&T, Western Electric Co., 
and Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc.); see also United States v. AT&T, 427 F. Supp. 
57,58 (D.D.C. 1976) (noting that Western Electric Co. was a wholly owned subsidiary 
of AT&T and that Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc. was jointly owned by AT&T and 
Western Electric); United States v. AT&T, No. 74-1698, 1976 WL 1321, at *1 (D.D.C. 
Oct. 1, 1976) (alleging that AT&T conspired with an additional twenty-three named 
telephone companies, of which AT&T owned some or all of the voting shares). 
2. See AT&T, 461 F. Supp. at 1317-18 (including allegations of denying access to 
local monopolies, making unlawful rate adjustments, and refusing to allow competitors' 
telephone customers to use their own terminal equipment or connect to the AT&T 
network). 
3. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,222-34 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub 
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Although commonly referred to 
as a "modified" decree, in actuality the court vacated a 1956 decree that resulted from a 
1949 antitrust suit brought against AT&T. See id. at 143. For a discussion of the proce­
dural history of the 1949 action see id. at 135-39. The government brought the 1974 suit 
in part because of the inadequacies of the 1956 decree in preventing AT&T from creat­
ing barriers to free competition. See id. at 139 n.18. The "modification" allowed the 
court to issue orders of compliance, modify or construe the decree, and punish viola­
tions of the decree. See id. at 143. 
4. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 143. The BOCs are companies that operate facili­
ties that allow customers to complete local calls and obtain access to long distance and 
international networks. See id. at 139 n.19. 
5. See id. at 142 n.41. 
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their ability to operate in local service markets, they were prohib­
ited from operating in the long-distance service6 and telecommuni­
cations equipment markets? 
The Consent Decree soon became too controversial for the dis­
trict court to enforce.8 In part to address the AT&T problem, Con­
gress enacted the Telecommunications Act9 in 1996 to establish a 
statutory scheme whereby the BOCs' entry into lines of business 
would be regulated by the Federal Communications Commission 
("FCC"). However, a new controversy has arisen. Although the 
Act rescinded the Consent Decree,lO it also contained a section en­
titled "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating Companies," 
which placed limits on the BOCs ability to enter the long-distance 
market.!1 In 1997, SBC Communications, Inc., an RBOC, filed suit 
against the United States and the FCC alleging that the Special Pro­
visions were invalid as an unconstitutional bill of attainder.12 An­
other RBOC made the same claim in the District of Columbia.13 
Both circuit courts held that the Special Provisions section of 
6. See SHC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 230 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998); 
see also AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227. The HOCs were permitted to operate within a 
geographically defined "local access and transport area" or "LATA." However, when a 
long distance call was made, the HOC was required to direct the call to an inter­
exchange carrier which carried the calls between LATAs or "interLATA." See SBC 
Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 230 n.3. 
7. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 224. The BOCs were prohibited from manufactur­
ing or marketing telecommunications products or customer premises equipment, as well 
as providing directory advertising services and information services. See id. at 143. 
8. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 231 n.5 (noting that District Court 
Judge Harold H. Greene, who handled and monitored the AT&T matter, was often 
referred to by journalists and other critics as the "telecommunication's czar" because of 
his potential influence and power over the industry). See infra note 182 and accompa­
nying text for a discussion of the controversy. 
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § l(a), 110 Stat. 56 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.c.). See infra Parts II.A and II.B for a discus­
sion of the Telecommunications Act, its history and its effects. 
10. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 
143; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1996 WL 255904 (D.D.C. Apr. 11, 
1996) (terminating the Consent Decree, as of the date the Telecommunication Act was 
signed into law, February 8, 1996). 
11. See 47 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (providing that "[n]either a 
Bell operating company, nor any affiliate of a Bell operating company, may provide 
interLATA services except as provided in this section"); see also id. § 271(c) (requiring 
the BOC to meet specified requirements); id. § 271(d) (providing procedures whereby a 
BOC may apply for authorization to provide such services). See infra Part II.B for a 
discussion of the Telecommunications Act and its effects. 
12. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 233. See infra Part II.A for a 
definition of bill of attainder. 
13. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
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the Telecommunications Act was not unconstitutional as a bill of 
attainder. This Note examines these findings and considers 
whether they are consistent with the bill of attainder prohibition in 
the United States Constitution. Part I of this Note examines the 
history of the attainder prohibition and its role in the separation of 
powers between the judicial and legislative branches of government 
and discusses the meaning and scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause 
as interpreted by Supreme Court decisions. Next, Part II outlines 
the history and purpose of the Special Provisions section of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the requirements it imposes 
on the BOCs. Part III examines the Fifth and District of Columbia 
Circuit Courts' application of the Bill of Attainder Clause to the 
Special Provisions. Finally, Part IV evaluates the Telecommunica­
tions Act's Special Provisions section and concludes that it is uncon­
stitutional as a bill of attainder because it constitutes legislation that 
operates with specificity and inflicts punishment on the BOCs. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. What is a Bill of Attainder? 
A bill of attainder is "a law that legislatively determines guilt 
and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable individual without pro­
vision of the protections of a judicial trial."14 In light of the bill of 
attainder's infamous tradition, the framers of the Constitution were 
determined to include a prohibition against bills of attainder en­
acted by either CongressI5 or the states.16 
The British Parliament first enacted bills of attainder in the 
fourteenth centuryP The initial purpose of the bills was to ensure 
that the estates of dead traitors would escheat to the Crown. IS The 
14. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). See, e.g., 
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 445 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
315-16 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); Ex parte Gar­
land, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866). 
15. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (stating that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex post 
facto Law shall be passed"). The presence of the prohibitions against bills of attainder 
and ex post facto laws in the same constitutional provision has been explained by the 
fact that legislative punishment of an individual (a bill of attainder) was often imposed 
retroactively (ex post facto). See ZECHARIA CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, 92-93 (1956). 
16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (stating that "[n]o State shall ... pass any 
Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law"). 
17. See Note, Bills ofAttainder and the Supreme Court in J960--Flernming v. Nes­
tor, 1961 WASH. u. L.Q. 402, 403. 
18. See Michael P. Lehmann, The Bill ofAttainder Doctrine: A Survey of the De­
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person to whom the bill of attainder applied was deemed attainted 
with "the corruption of blood."19 This meant that the person could 
not inherit or transfer his wealth to his descendants.2o The "convic­
tion" was legislatively determined and could occur regardless of 
whether the condemned behavior was previously prohibited by 
law.21 
Bills of attainder were usually enacted "in times of rebellion, 
or gross subserviency to the [C]rown, or of violent political excite­
ments."22 However, bills of attainder were not reserved for those 
perceived as traitors or threats to the Crown, but were often gener­
ally applied to other categories of individuals such as the poor.23 
Indeed, while some bills of attainder singled out named individuals 
for punishment, other bills punished many individuals by designat­
ing a broad range of characteristics that applied to those 
individuals.24 
While the bills usually imposed capital punishment, sometimes 
the punishment was less than death and the bill was called a bill of 
pains and penalties.25 Punishment under a bill of pains and penal­
ties could include banishment, deprivation of an avocation or office, 
or disfranchisement.26 
Although the Constitutional Convention ultimately denounced 
the use of bills of attainder, American bills of attainder were com­
monplace before 1787 as a means of eliminating the presence of 
Tories in the colonies.27 The bills, not unlike their English prede­
cisional Law,S HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 772 (1978) (citing CHAFEE, supra note 15, 
at 102). 
19. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 381. 
20. Cf Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 327 (1867) (holding that a 
deprivation of the right to practice an avocation constitutes punishment in the Bill of 
Attainder context in accordance with the history of bills of attainder in England). 
21. See id. 
22. Id. at 323 (quoting Justice Story). 
23. See Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 10 (D.C.S.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8126) (citing an 
English bill of attainder that disfranchised all voters who fell below a certain yearly 
rental income). 
24. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 323-24 (referring to an English bill against 
the Earl of Kildare and others, which stated that" 'all such persons which be or hereto­
fore have been comforters, abettors, partakers, confederates, or adherents unto the said 
late earl ... in his or their false and traitorous acts and purposes, shall in likewise stand, 
and be attainted, adjudged, and convicted of high treason"') (citation omitted). 
25. See Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. at 9-10. 
26. See id. Disfranchisement is "the taking away of the elective franchise (that is, 
the right of voting in public elections) from any citizen or class of citizens." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 468 (6th. ed. 1990). 
27. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965); see also Flemming v. 
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 634 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Americans who favored the 
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cessors, banished British sympathizers as traitors, confiscated their 
property, and disqualified them from political offices and other pro­
fessions.28 The framers of the U.S. Constitution ultimately sought 
to end this practice of legislative punishment. 
B. The Separation of Powers Doctrine 
Given the history of bills of attainder in England and in the 
colonies under the Articles of Confederation, the framers of the 
U.S. Constitution sought to ensure that the bill of attainder device 
would not be abused by the legislative branches of the federal or 
state governments of the United States.29 Alexander Hamilton and 
James Madison were among those who advocated for a provision in 
the Constitution banning bills of attainder.30 Madison wrote that 
bills of attainder: 
are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to 
every principle of sound legislation. . .. Our own experience has 
taught us ... that additional fences against these dangers ought 
not to be omitted. Very properly therefore have [sic] the Con­
vention added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal se­
curity and private rights ....31 
Hamilton shared a similar sentiment: 
[N]othing is more common than for a free people, in times of 
heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into 
the government principles and precedents which afterwards 
prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of disquali­
fication, disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legisla­
ture. . .. If the legislature can disfranchise any number of citizens 
at pleasure by general descriptions, ... [t]he name of liberty ap­
plied to such a government, would be a mockery of common 
British side in the American Revolutionary War were known as Tories. WEBSTER'S 
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2414 (1993). 
28. See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 735 (1951) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); see also James Westfall Thompson, Anti-Loyalist Legislation During the 
American Revolution, 3 ILL. L. REv. 81, 147 (1908). See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 
n.15. 
29. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 318 (1946) ("[O]ur ancestors had 
ample reason to know that legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to 
liberty to exist in the nation of free men they envisioned. And so they proscribed bills 
of attainder."). 
30. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison), Nos. 78, 84 (Alexan­
der Hamilton). 
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 227 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
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sense.32 
Referring to the bill of attainder, Hamilton declared that the power 
to punish must be kept separate from the legislature.33 Otherwise, 
unchecked power could present the considerable danger that "all 
the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to 
nothing" and there would be "no liberty."34 Hamilton further ex­
plained that it is the province of the courts to invalidate bills of 
attainder when they are created because "limitations of this kind 
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the medium 
of courts of justice; whose duty it must be to declare all acts con­
trary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void. "35 
As early as 1810, the Supreme Court addressed the importance 
of the separation of powers issue involved in the Bill of Attainder 
Clause in Fletcher v. Peck.36 The Court found that not only did the 
framers intend to guard against "sudden and strong passions" that 
could influence the legislature to deprive individuals of property, 
but the restrictions placed on that power, including the Bill of At­
tainder Clause, were "founded in [that] sentiment."37 The Court 
reasoned that "[i]t is the peculiar province of the legislature to pre­
scribe general rules for the government of society; the application 
of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of 
other departments."38 Consequently, the Supreme Court has ex­
amined the constitutionality of legislation that has been alleged to 
single out individuals or groups for punishment under the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. 
C. Supreme Court Interpretation 
The United States Supreme Court has had few opportunities to 
interpret the Bill of Attainder Clause and thus draw the line be­
tween permissible legislation and legislative punishment. However, 
32. JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 34 
(1859). 
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 394 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 
1982). 
34. Id. 
35. Id.; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803) (holding 
that it is the province of the judiciary to declare void legislative acts that are contrary to 
the Constitution). 
36. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); see also Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 
213, 286 (1827) (noting that the general intent of the Bill of Attainder Clause was to be 
"a general provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights"). 
37. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138. 
38. Id. at 136. 
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the Court has established a two-part test which must be satisfied for 
legislation to constitute a proscribed bill of attainder. First, the act 
must operate with specificity.39 Second, the act must inflict punish­
ment without the benefit of a judicial proceeding.40 
1. Specificity 
In England, it was not necessary for a bill of attainder to specif­
ically refer to an individual for that individual to be attainted. 
Often the bills referred to one person by name and any other per­
son who acted similarly, such as in rebellion against the Crown.41 
As a result, bills of attainder generally were directed at individuals, 
but could target whole classes of individuals.42 
In the United States, however, the Bill of Attainder Clause has 
been invoked when "specifically designated persons or groups"43 
have been punished by a legislative act.44 The Bill of Attainder 
Clause thus protects those individuals or private groups that would 
otherwise be "vulnerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt. "45 
Acts that have narrowly targeted named individuals46 or have af­
fected a broad group, such as ex-Confederates,47 are examples of 
acts that the Supreme Court has identified as acts that target indi­
viduals or groups and meet the specificity requirements. Still, the 
specificity requirement remains to be defined in some areas, such as 
39. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321-23 (1946); SBC Communica­
tions, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998). 
40. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). 
41. See Ex ~rte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 8-9 (D.CS.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8126) (citing 
English bills of attainder). See supra notes 18, 20, 22 and accompanying text for discus­
sion of the English origins of the bill of attainder. 
42. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); see also supra 
note 24 discussing bills directed at an individual. 
43. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447 (1965). 
44. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513 (1989) (Ste­
vens, J., concurring) (private citizens); Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315 (individuals); Cummings, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 324 (individuals or a class of individuals). 
45. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,324 (1966) (holding that a state 
cannot raise a Bill of Attainder claim for its citizens because the Clause only applies to 
citizens, and a state is not the parens patriae of its citizens). 
46. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 315 (finding that an appropriations bill that named 
three government employees, including Lovett and two others, for subversive activities 
and withdrew their salaries met the specificity requirement). 
47. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 322. The Court found that an act that 
targeted anyone "who has ever been in armed hostility to the United States ... or to the 
government of this State; or has ever given aid, comfort, countenance, or support to 
persons engaged in any such hostility; or has ever ... adhered to the enemies, foreign or 
domestic" was specific. See id. at 279 (emphasis omitted). 
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where a legislative act singles out a corporation for punishment.48 
The mere fact that an individual or group has been defined in a 
legislative act does not mean that the Bill of Attainder Clause is 
implicated.49 Congress may legislate regarding any person or group 
who commits certain acts or possesses certain general characteris­
tics so long as it sets forth generally applicable rules and leaves to 
the courts the role of deciding who has committed those acts or 
possesses those characteristics.50 On the other hand, when the leg­
islature specifically designates an individual or group and punishes 
that individual or group, the law will be struck down. For example, 
in United States v. Brown,5! the Supreme Court invalidated a law 
that forbade members of the Communist Party from holding posi­
tions as officers in labor unions as a means of limiting political 
strikes.52 Because the statute "designate[d] in no uncertain terms 
the persons who possess[ ed] the feared characteristic[] . . . [i.e.] 
members of the Communist Party,"53 the statute met the specificity 
requirement of the Bill of Attainder Clause. By contrast, the 
Supreme Court dealt with another statute targeting the Communist 
Party a few years earlier, but found it to be constitutional since the 
act described the Communist Party by its activities without specifi­
cally naming it.54 
In addition to evaluating the terms of a statute to determine 
whether an act operates with sufficient generality to avoid a chal­
lenge under the Bill of Attainder Clause, the Court has also consid­
ered whether the effect of an act can be avoided by the individual 
or group that it designates. For example, in Communist Party ofthe 
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Boarxi,55 the Court 
found that the statute in question operated with insufficient speci­
ficity to constitute a bill of attainder because it was entirely possible 
for an individual to avoid falling within the statute's broad defini­
48. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 n.ll (5th Cir. 1998) 
(suggesting that the Supreme Court has indicated in dicta that the Bill of Attainder 
Clause applies to corporations). 
49. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471-72 (1977). 
50. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450, 454 n.29 (1965) (stating that 
the legislature can use shorthand phrases in place of a list of general characteristics, but 
the substitution must be a semantically equivalent one). See the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 
for the list of Congress's enumerated powers. 
51. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
52. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 437. 
53. Id. at 450. 
54. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
55. 367 U.S. 1 (1961). 
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tion by altering his activities.56 Similarly, a statute that prohibited 
nonregistrants of the draft from obtaining educational financial aid 
was upheld in Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest 
Research Group.57 The statute allowed a thirty-day grace period in 
which nonregistrants could comply with registration requirements 
and again become eligible for aid.58 As a result, the Court found 
that the individuals could avoid the act's operation and were not 
sufficiently specified by the act.59 The Court thus found that a stat­
ute may designate a specific group without violating the Bill of At­
tainder Clause if the group is broadly defined or if its members can 
avoid the act by altering their activities. 
Even when a statute mentions an individual by name, that 
alone may not be sufficient to satisfy the specificity requirement nor 
automatically invalidate an act as a bill of attainder.60 In Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services ,61 a congressional act required 
former President Nixon to relinquish an estimated 42 million pages 
of documents and 880 tape recordings in order to preserve them 
and make them available for judicial proceedings.62 However, the 
Court found that designating Nixon by name alone did not satisfy 
the specificity requirement.63 The Court reasoned that while the 
first section of the act dealt only with former President Nixon, the 
second section focused on creating a commission to study the feasi­
bility of preserving materials of all future presidents and federal of­
ficials for their historical value.64 Furthermore, the Court noted 
that presidential papers of other former presidents were already 
preserved in libraries and therefore did not need to be obtained.65 
The Court concluded that Nixon was classified as "a legitimate class 
of one,"66 and, therefore, Congress could single him out in legisla­
56. See id. at 88. 
57. 468 U.S. 841, 859 (1984). 
58. See id. at 849. 
59. See id. 
60. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 471 (1977); Selective 
Servo Sys., 468 U.S. at 851. But see Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A 
Suggested Approach to the Bill ofAttainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 353 (1962) (sug­
gesting that singling out a person or specified group for the imposition of burdens is in 
itself indicative of punishment). 
61. 443 U.S. 425 (1977). 
62. See id. at 430. 
63. See id. at 471-72. 
64. See id. at 472. 
65. See id. The Court also noted that there was "an imminent danger that the 
tape recordings would be destroyed," impliedly by Nixon himself. Id. 
66. Id. 
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tion without implicating the Bill of Attainder Clause.67 
When a legislative act operates with sufficient specificity to 
bring it within the Bill of Attainder Clause, the second prong of the 
bill of attainder test must be considered. This second prong re­
quires that the specific individual or group targeted must have legis­
lative punishment imposed upon it. 
2. What Is Legislative Punishment? 
In a broad sense, punishment may be defined as "any fine, pen­
alty, or confinement inflicted upon a person by the authority of the 
law and the judgment and sentence of a court, for some crime or 
offense committed by him, or for his omission of a duty enjoined by 
law."68 Punishment operates "to reprimand the wrongdoer [and] to 
deter others,"69 but may serve other goals including retribution, re­
habilitation, or prevention.70 Regardless of the intended goal, pun­
ishment imposed upon a specified individual or group by the 
legislature without the benefit of a judicial trial violates the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. Thus, to constitute a bill of attainder, a legisla­
tive act must "inflict punishment"71 in addition to meeting the spec­
ificity requirement.72 
Since most legislation has adverse effects on individuals or 
groups, it is not enough that "the [a ]ct imposes burdensome conse­
quences"73 to constitute punishment. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court has formulated a three-part test to determine whether legis­
67. See id. at 484. The Court reached this result, in part, to avoid bill of attainder 
challenges "whenever a law imposes undesired consequences on an individual or on a 
class that is not defined at a proper level of generality." Id. at 469-70. The Supreme 
Court indicated that the bill of attainder would not be implicated simply because a 
legislative act has a negative effect on an individual or group since the Bill of Attainder 
Clause "was not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine." Id. at 
471; see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995) (stating that 
Congress usually acts by laws of general application, but that private bills are common 
and permissible so long as they do not violate the Bill of Attainder Clause). 
68. BLACK'S LAW DICITONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990). 
69. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603,630 (1960) (Douglas, I., dissenting) (citing 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958». 
70. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). One important purpose 
of criminal punishment is achieved through incapacitation-to "depriv[e] the party of 
the power to do future mischief." 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 11-12. 
71. Brown, 381 U.S. at 456-60. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867). 
72. See supra Part I.e.l for a discussion of the specificity requirement. 
73. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). 
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lative punishment exists in the bill of attainder context.74 First, the 
"historical test" examines whether the deprivation is the kind of 
punishment traditionally prohibited by the Clause.75 Next, the 
"functional test" examines whether the act, "viewed in terms of the 
type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to 
further nonpunitive legislative purposes."76 Finally, the third con­
sideration is the "motivational test," which examines "whether the 
legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish."77 How­
ever, whether each part of the test establishes a requirement for 
punishment, or whether satisfaction of anyone of the three parts is 
determinative of punishment by itself has not been clearly 
articulated.78 
a. The historical test 
Under the historical test, the Supreme Court has considered 
the nature of the first laws deemed to be bills of attainder.79 This 
inquiry examines the nature of bills of attainder in England and in 
the colonies to determine what traditionally constituted punish­
ment.80 Such punishments have included execution, imprisonment, 
banishment, the confiscation of property, and bars to employment 
in particular fields.81 Even if punishment was less than death, the 
act was termed a bill of pains and penalties and was still prohibited 
by the Bill of Attainder Clause.82 
An example of one of the first bill of attainder laws was a law 
enacted by the State of Missouri when it ratified its constitution in 
1865. The constitution contained a provision that worked to ex­
clude ex-Confederates from political offices and other professions, 
74. See id. at 474-78. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest 
Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984). 
75. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474. 
76. Id. at 475-76. 
77. Id. at 478; see also United States V. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 308-14 (1946). 
78. See supra notes 75-77 for a discussion of the three-part test to determine 
whether legislative punishment exists and infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the three­
part test's limitations. 
79. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys., 468 U.S. at 847-48; Hawker V. New York, 170 
U.S. 189, 191 (1898). 
80. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473-75. 
81. See id. at 474. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for other examples 
of punishments. 
82. See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); see also Ex parte 
Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 11 (D.CS.D. Ga. 1866) (No. 8126); Ogden V. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 
Wheat.) 213 (1827); Fletcher V. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,138 (1810) (stating that "[a] 
bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or 
may do both"). 
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including those of attorney, priest, or other clergy.83 In Cummings 
v. Missouri,84 the Supreme Court invalidated the state's constitu­
tional provision as a bill of attainder.85 The provision required can­
didates and those already holding the statutorily defined positions 
to take "test oath[s]"86 professing their loyalty to the United States 
and swearing that they had never sympathized with or engaged in 
the rebellion.87 Any person defined by the statute had the choice of 
taking the oath or losing his position.88 
In Cummings, a Missouri priest had not taken the oath, was 
convicted of teaching and preaching, and was ultimately fined and 
imprisoned.89 The Court noted that while it was not uncommon or 
unreasonable for England and France to require test oaths for of­
fice in the past, those oaths were always limited to affirmations of 
present beliefs.90 Missouri, however, had enacted a "retrospective" 
oath that punished individuals for past acts which had "no possible 
relation to their fitness for those pursuits."91 The Court acknowl­
edged that Missouri had a legitimate interest in determining the 
qualifications of its offices, but an exclusion from office could not 
be based on an individual's past actions if there was no such rela­
tion to the individual's fitness to hold office.92 
Thus, in one of the first significant cases regarding the Bill of 
Attainder Clause, the. Supreme Court broadly defined what consti­
tuted punishment, holding that "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil 
or political, previously enjoyed, may be punishment, the circum­
stances attending and the causes of the deprivation determining this 
fact."93 Such deprivations may include: 
83. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 317 (noting that the Constitution referred 
specifically to any "office of honor [or] trust"). 
84. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867). 
85. See id. at 316, 332. 
86. A test oath· is "[a]n oath required to be taken as a criterion of the fitness of 
the person to fill a public or political office; but particularly an oath of fidelity and 
allegiance (past or present) to the established government." BLACK'S LAW DICTION­
ARY 1477 (6th. ed. 1990). 
87. See Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 316-17. 
88. See id. at 317. 
89. See id. at 316. 
90. See id. at 318. An oath requirement is valid if it requires a party to swear to 
have not committed a prohibited act since the passage of that act. By contrast, a retro­
spective oath requires a pledge that the prohibited act was never committed and "would 
affect every hour of his past life." Ex parte Law, 15 F. Cas. 3, 14 (D.CS.D. Ga. 1866) 
(No. 8126). 
91. Cummings, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 318-19. 
92. See id. at 319. 
93. Id. at 320. 
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Disqualification from office . . . as in cases of conviction upon 
impeachment.... [or] [d]isqualification from the pursuits of a 
lawful avocation ... . 
. . . [1]n the pursuit of happiness all avocations, all honors, all 
positions, are ... rights ... all equal before the law. Any depriva­
tion or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is pun­
ishment, and can be in no otherwise [sic] defined.94 
The Cummings Court did not focus on whether the state could pre­
scribe avocation qualifications, but instead focused on whether the 
qualifications imposed punishment, and thus constituted a bill of 
attainder.95 
In Ex parte Garland,96 a similar case decided in the same term, 
the Court examined a congressional act that exacted an oath from 
those who would practice law in the Supreme Court, any circuit and 
district courts, and the Court of Claims.97 The Court struck down 
the law on the same grounds as in Cummings.98 However, even at 
this early date, the punishment requirement was debated.99 The 
dissents in both Cummings and Garland argued that legislatures 
have the power to establish qualification standards for political of­
fices and the legal profession.1°O Therefore, the oaths were not con­
94. Id. at 320-22. 
95. See id. at 318-19. 
96. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). 
97. See id. at 374-75. 
98. See id. at 380. 
99. See id. at 382 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller was joined by four others 
in a dissent that applied to both Cummings and Garland. Referring to Garland, but 
"speak[ing] to principles equally applicable [to Cummings]," Justice Miller noted that 
the act could not constitute a bill of attainder because it did not "attaint the blood" of 
its target, rendering him unable to inherit or will his possessions; establish a conviction 
and sentence passed by legislative measure; exist absent a previous law requiring pun­
ishment for the "offense"; and it did not result from an investigation or determination 
of gUilt made in the absence of the "offender" or without recognized rules of evidence. 
See id. at 383, 387-88 (Miller, J., dissenting). Significantly, the dissenters maintained 
that the legislative acts did not designate a person or group of persons with sufficient 
specificity and did not inflict punishment. See id. at 389-90 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
Rather, the acts were proper in that they served to protect the public from the future 
harms of ex-Confederates and the required oaths were considered "prospective in na­
ture." Id. at 391 (Miller, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissenters argued that the 
mere fact that a qualification is not attainable by everyone does not make it punish­
ment. See id. at 395 (Miller, J., dissenting). The act did not deprive the attorney of "an 
absolute right," but of "a privilege conferred by law on a person who complies with the 
prescribed conditions," and which depends on the continued possession of good moral 
character and skill. See id. at 384 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
100. See supra 99 for these arguments. 
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trary to the Constitution,lol Later cases would find the dissents' 
arguments to be valid justifications for upholding state statutes 
challenged, inter alia, as bills of attainder,lo2 
Another type of statutory punishment that the Supreme Court 
has deemed to constitute punishment in a historical sense is where a 
regulation effectively forecloses the possibility of engaging in a par­
ticular occupation. In United States v. Lovett,103 the statute at issue 
was an appropriations bill that provided that three individuals, who 
had been working for the government, would lose their compensa­
tion unless reappointed by the President,l04 The act did not ex­
pressly prohibit the named individuals from working for the 
government because they were thought to be "subversives";lo5 ac­
cording to the Court, however, it was sufficient that the act had 
such an effect,l06 Because the so-called "appropriations bill" af­
fected the individuals by creating a "'perpetual exclusion' from a 
chosen vocation," it was found to be legislative punishment.107 
In part because the historical test for legislative punishment by 
itself provides a narrow view of what constitutes punishment, and 
because the Supreme Court was aware of the risk of creative legis­
lation that effectively punishes, the Court developed the second test 
for legislative punishment: the functional test. 
b. 	 The functional test: drawing the line between nonpunitive goals 
and punishment 
The functional test is another means of determining whether a 
legislative act is punitive. This test attempts to distinguish between 
a permissive legislative regulation as opposed to a nonpermissive 
punitive action based on "the type and severity of the burdens im­
101. See supra 99 for discussion of the Cummings and Garland cases. 
102. See, e.g., Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196-99 (1898); Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 125-28 (1889). See infra Part I.C.2.b.i for a discussion of whether 
a legislative act is punitive under the functional test. 
103. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
104. See id. at 305 & n.1. Section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriations 
Act provided: "No part of any appropriation, allocation, or fund ... shall be used, after 
November 15, 1943, to pay any part of the salary, or other compensation for the per­
sonal services, of Goodwin B. Watson, William E. Dodd, Junior, and Robert Morss 
Lovett ...." Id. 
105. See id. at 311 n.3 (defining subversive activity as "conduct intentionally de­
structive of or inimical to the Government of the United States"). 
106. See id. at 316-17. The act was labeled as an appropriations measure, but it 
named and withdrew the salaries of three United States government workers because 
Congress believed them guilty of subversive activities. See id. at 311-12. 
107. See id. at 316 (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,377 (1867». 
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posed."108 Through its decisions, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that certain kinds of legislation that appear to be punitive are in fact 
furthering nonpunitive goals such as developing qualification stan­
dards and preventing future harms. 
1. Preventing future harms 
The Constitution provides Congress with an extensive list of 
powers that has been interpreted and limited in scope by the 
Supreme Court.109 However, constitutional limits on state and fed­
eral power have not prohibited Congress or the states from legislat­
ing in the area of businesses and occupations. l1O For example, a 
state may legitimately prescribe qualifications for a profession, such 
as the medical profession, if those qualifications are related to the 
profession and reasonably attainable.1l1 When West Virginia re­
quired its physicians to graduate from medical schools before licen­
sure, and prohibited unlicensed doctors from continuing their 
practice, the statute was challenged under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment.112 But the Court held that a due process claim would not 
stand where a "deprivation ... is ... imposed by the State for the 
protection of society. "113 
Soon after, a similar New York statute was challenged as a bill 
of attainder in Hawker v. New York.t14 The statute made it a crime 
for those with past felony convictions to practice as physicians.115 
The Court rejected the argument that the statute constituted legis­
lative punishment by depriving convicted felons of the opportunity 
to practice medicine because of their past conduct.116 Instead, the 
Court was persuaded that the character of a physician was a factor 
necessary to determine if he was qualified; therefore, the legislation 
108. Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475 (1977). 
109. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) (commerce clause); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (taxing 
power). 
110. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-28 nn.25-27 (1934) (providing 
examples of various business regulations that have been within Congress's powers). 
111. See Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889). 
112. See id. at 121 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 which reads: "[n]o state 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"). 
113. Id. at 122. The Court reasoned that "[t]he power of the State to provide for 
the general welfare of its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its 
judgment, will secure ... them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as 
well as of deception and fraud." Id. 
114. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
115. See id. at 190. 
116. See id. at 191-92. 
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was a permissible exercise of state power to regulate a matter of 
public health.!17 In a later case, the Court stated that: 
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are 
brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is whether 
the legislative aim was to punish that individual for past activity 
[and is therefore prohibited], or whether the restriction of the 
individual comes about as a relevant incident to a regulation of a 
present situation, such as the proper qualifications for a profes­
sion [and is therefore allowed].118 
With the precedent provided by Hawker and Dent,119 a statute 
could limit the availability of some professions to certain individu­
als through the use of qualification standards even though legisla­
tive exclusions of individuals from chosen occupations had been 
historically regarded as unconstitutional punishment under Cum­
mings .120 The legislature could now assert the need to establish em­
ployment restrictions in the interest of protecting society from 
potential harms and avoid the Bill of Attainder Clause. 
However, as a result of Hawker and Dent, it became increas­
ingly difficult to determine whether a qualification standard consti­
tuted punishment, or whether it was a legitimate legislative act 
created with the "intention . . . to forestall future dangerous 
acts. "121 In some cases, qualification standards were permitted if 
the legislature was operating on the rational understanding that cer­
tain individuals, with particular political or business affiliations, 
posed a harm to the national economy122 or other governmental 
interest.123 
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,124 the Court 
found that an act that limited the ability of communists to hold of­
fices in labor unions was not a bill of attainder. While the act pro­
vided that no labor union petitions would be considered by the 
National Labor Relations Board unless officers filed an affidavit 
with the Board swearing that they were not members of the Com­
117. See id. at 193-94. 
118. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). 
119. See supra 111-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of Dent. 
120. See supra Part 1.C.2.a for a discussion of the historical test regarding bills of 
attainder. 
121. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,414 (1950). 
122. See id. at 392. 
123. See De Veau, 363 U.S. at 158-59 (sustaining a state law prohibiting ex-con­
victs from holding positions in labor organizations that represent employment). 
124. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
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munist Party,125 the act was deemed constitutional because it was 
within Congress's power to eliminate the risk of political strikes in 
labor unions that could potentially harm commerce. The Court 
found that Congress made a rational determination that union of­
ficers who belonged to the Communist Party were more likely to 
use their power to bring about political strikes,126 therefore con­
cluding that the legislation was reasonably related to its goaL 127 
The Court pointed out that this case was distinct from the 
other bill of attainder questions it had faced since the individuals 
were not being punished for past actions, but were only subject to a 
possible loss of position because of a "substantial ground for the 
congressional judgment that their beliefs and loyalties will be trans­
formed into future conduct."l28 Even though the conclusion was 
based on the Communist Party's history of conduct, the Court 
found that the conclusion was not altered because the act was "in­
tended to prevent future action rather than to punish past 
action."129 
Although the Court upheld the statute in Douds, in United 
States v. Brown,130 the Court held that a congressional amendment 
to the same statute that made it a crime for a recent Communist 
Party member to be a union officer, as opposed to merely hindering 
the effectiveness of a labor union with Communist officers, consti­
tuted a bill of attainder. l3l Later cases also questioned the Douds 
decision, although the case was never formally overtumed.132 
125. See id. at 385-86. 
126. See id. at 391. 
127. See id. at 390-91. In dissent, Justice Black argued that "[N]ever before has 
this Court held that the Government could for any reason attaint persons for their 
political beliefs or affiliations. It does so today." Id. at 449 (Black, J., dissenting). 
128. Id. at 413 (citing United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) and Cummings 
v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867), where those subject to the oaths of loyalty 
could never hold the positions because the question of their past loyalty would never 
change). 
129. See Douds, 339 U.S. at 413. The Court further emphasized that the mem­
bers were not being punished for past conduct since if they were to remove themselves 
from the activities of the Communist Party, they would again become eligible for union 
office. See id. at 414. 
130. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
131. See id. at 438-40. 
132. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 76 (1969). The petitioner in 
Bryson sought to have a conviction under the statute in question in Douds overturned 
after Brown was decided. See id. at 65-66. However, the conviction was based on his 
filing a fraudulent affidavit and the Court found that where the defendant has acted 
fraudulently, the constitutionality of the underlying statute was irrelevant. See id. at 68. 
In dissent, Justice Douglas stated, "Whatever may be said technically about any remain­
ing vitality of the Douds case, it obviously belongs to a discredited regime, though, like 
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Nevertheless, the year after Douds was decided, the Supreme 
Court reiterated the notion that merely because Congress has con­
sidered past conduct of an individual or group when drafting legis­
lation, it does not follow that Congress is punishing; even past 
(dis )loyalty may reasonably relate to the "present and future [pub­
lic] truSt."133 As a result, the Court upheld a California statute that 
required political candidates in Los Angeles to take an oath that 
they had never advocated, taught, or affiliated with any organiza­
tion that advocated the overthrow of the government.134 The Court 
found that the limitation did not constitute punishment because it 
merely established qualification standards that were reasonably re­
lated to public employment.135 
Similarly, other cases allowed the legislature to prevent per­
ceived future harms by enacting statutes that barred aliens from 
certain occupations even though the Constitution generally disal­
lowed such action under the Fourteenth Amendment.136 In addi­
tion, proscriptions against certain lines of business were also 
allowed, despite bill of attainder claims, to guard against the 
"tempting opportunities" to commit harmful acts with which indi­
viduals might be presented.137 For instance, a statute may legiti­
mately be designed to deal with "the probability or likelihood" that 
a bank director would be tempted to use his influence at the bank 
to involve the bank or its customers in securities when the bank 
director was also an employee of a securities firm.138 Another stat­
ute, which prohibited ex-felons from holding labor union positions, 
was found to be a legitimate guard against the probability that ex­
felons in union positions would lead to corrupt practices by the 
union.139 Thus, the Supreme Court has suggested that legislative 
Plessy v. Ferguson ... it has never been officially overruled." Id. at 76 (Douglas, J. 
dissenting). 
133. Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, no (1951). 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at no, n2 (distinguishing Cummings and Garland as cases where the 
legislation was not intended to provide standards or qualifications for employment). 
136. See Ohio v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (upholding an ordinance 
prohibiting licensure of aliens to maintain billiard halls); see also Truax v. Raich, 239 
U.S. 33 (1915) (striking down a statute that prohibited employers from employing aliens 
in more than twenty percent of their workforce); Pearl Assurance Co. v. Harrington, 38 
F. Supp. 411 (D. Mass.), affd per curiam, 313 U.S. 549 (1941). 
137. Board of Governors v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 449 (1947). 
138. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,392 (1950) (citing 
Board of Governors, 329 U.S. at 447, which held that section 32 of the Banking Act of 
1933 was not unconstitutional even though it prohibited partnership members in securi­
ties firms from simultaneously serving as bank directors). 
139. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 147 (1960) (finding state statute 
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punishment might not exist where Congress acted reasonably to 
prevent future harms. 
11. Other non punitive legislation 
Additional Supreme Court opinions have emphasized other 
nonpunitive legislative goals when finding that a bill of attainder 
did not exist. For instance, in Selective Service System v. Minnesota 
Public Interest Research Group,140 the Court found that the act in 
question served the purpose of encouraging males to register for 
the draft and more fairly allocating federal aid to those "willing to 
meet their responsibilities to the United States."141 The Court has 
also upheld statutes requiring deportation, since deportation does 
not constitute punishment,142 Rather, deportation is deemed to be 
a legitimate exercise of congressional power "to fix the conditions 
under which aliens are to be permitted to enter and remain in this 
country."143 A provision of the Social Security Act was likewise 
upheld despite a claim that the termination of benefits to deported 
aliens constituted punishment without a judicial trial. l44 The sanc­
tion was deemed to be a "mere denial of a noncontractual govern­
mental benefit."145 The provision served the purpose of providing 
better administration of the Social Security Act because there was 
"[n]o affirmative disability or restraint ... imposed."146 Accord­
ingly, the provision did not constitute unconstitutional punish­
ment.147 In Nixon, the Act under scrutiny also did not fail the 
functional test because Congress had a legitimate interest in secur­
ing potential evidence for a criminal trial and preserving historical 
prohibiting ex-felons from working as labor union representatives to be constitutional 
given the evidence that waterfront crime was "largely due to ... [t]he presence on the 
waterfront of convicted felons in many influential positions"). 
140. 468 U.S. 841 (1984). See also supra 57-58 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group. 
141. See id. at 854. 
142. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 
522, 530-31 (1954); Fong Yue TIng v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
143. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 616 (citing Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 709, which 
defined deportation as "the removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his 
presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment 
being imposed"); see also Galvan, 347 U.S. at 531. 
144. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 613. In Flemming, the statute denied benefits to 
those who had engaged in subversive activities. See id. at 618 & n.1O. Nestor was de­
ported for being a Communist, and then was denied benefits under the Social Security 
Act. See id. at 605. 
145. Id. at 617. 
146. Id. 
147. See id. 
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documents.148 
When determining if punishment exists, the Court has consid­
ered other factors besides the presence of a nonpunitive goal, such 
as whether the deprivation in question is absolute or offers a means 
of avoiding its effect. In American Communications Ass'n v. 
Douds,149 for example, the challenged statute required affirmations 
by union officers that they were not Communist Party members, 
but did not absolutely forbid them from holding union office if they 
did not make the affirmation.1so Rather, the Act only made it more 
difficult for the union to remain effective if it chose to retain of­
ficers who did not comply with the statute, by limiting review by the 
National Labor Relations Board to only those unions with affirma­
tions on file.1S1 As a result, the legislation did not impose punish­
ment.152 In another case dealing with the Communist Party, the 
Supreme Court again refused to find a bill of attainder since the 
legislative sanctions were escapable.153 Because members of the 
party could discontinue their practices within the group, thereby 
not being subject to the Act, the Court held the Act did not punish 
party members.1s4 The Supreme Court later appeared to back 
away from the escapability of a statute as indicative of whether the 
legislation constituted punishment.1ss However, when the issue 
arose again, the Court returned to its position that the presence of 
an escape route was evidence that the statute was nonpunitive and 
therefore not a bill of attainder.1s6 
148. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477-78 (1977). See 
supra Part 1.C.2.b for a discussion of the functional test. 
149. 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See supra 124-129 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of Douds. 
150. See id. at 414 (stating that "there is no one who may not, by a voluntary 
alteration of the loyalties which impel him to action, become eligible to sign the 
affidavit"). 
151. See id. at 390. 
152. See id. at 413-14. 
153. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88 (1961) (upholding the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 
which required associations engaging in communist activities to register with the 
Board). 
154. See id. 
155. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 457 n.32 (1965) (stating that 
neither Communist Party nor Douds require "inescapability as an absolute prerequisite 
to a finding of attainder ... [and that] an absolute rule would have flown in the face of 
explicit precedent, Cummings v. State of Missouri ... as well as the historical back­
ground of the ... prohibition"). 
156. See Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 
841, 853 (1984). The Court found that "[a] statute that leaves open perpetually the 
possibility of qualifying for aid does not fall within the historical meaning of ... punish­
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Even when legislation involves some asserted legitimate goal, 
the restrictions may still constitute punishment.157 Consequently, 
legislation does not avoid bill of attainder status merely by asserting 
a nonpunitive goaL Neither does the severity of the effects of an 
act determine whether it qualifies as punishment.15S As a result, 
"each case has turned on its own highly particularized context. "159 
However, in determining whether a statute is penal, a controlling 
factor is the "evident purpose of the legislature."l60 Thus, the moti­
vational test has been developed to ascertain the legislature's pur­
pose for enacting questionable legislation. 
c. The motivational test: legislative intent 
The Supreme Court has required a high standard of evidence 
to indicate a punitive legislative intent since "mudicial inquiries 
into Congressional motives are at best a hazardous matter, and 
when that inquiry seeks to go behind objective manifestations it be­
comes a dubious affair indeed."161 Thus, the Court has been hesi­
tant to strike down congressional enactments as bills of attainder 
without "unmistakable evidence of punitive intent. "162 Generally, 
the Court has been unwilling to find such strong evidence of 
intent.163 
In Nixon, the Court found that the legislative record did not 
ment." Id. The Court distinguished Cummings and Garland on the grounds that in 
those cases one's status as an ex-Confederate was "irreversible." Id. at 851. In Selective 
Servo Sys., however, applicants could simply register for the draft to avoid the legisla­
tion's negative effects. See id. 
157. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-60. The Brown Court criticized the Court in 
Douds for concluding that if an act is not purely retributive, it does not constitute pun­
ishment. See id. at 460. 
158. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 616 n.9 (1960). 
159. Id. at 616. 
160. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958). 
161. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (requiring "only the clearest proof' to establish 
punitive intent). See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478-82 
(1977); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (181O) (stating that "it is not on 
slight implication and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be pronounced to have 
transcended its powers"). 
162. See Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 
841,856 n.15 (1984) (quoting Flemming, 363 U.S. at 619). 
163. See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 618-19 (finding no bill of attainder where a denial 
of social security benefits to deported aliens was not based solely on the deportations, 
but on the grounds for the deportations); see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478. But see Flem­
ming, 363 U.S. at 633 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that the aim of the act was 
clearly to legislatively take away property on the grounds of "act[ing] in a certain way 
or embrac[ing] a certain ideology"). 
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suggest punitive intent toward former President Nixon.164 In refus­
ing to strike down the legislation that forced Nixon to relinquish his 
presidential papers, the Court considered the transcripts of Senate 
and House Committee Reports and found that the reports failed to 
show punitive intent.165 The reports instead reaffirmed the 
nonpunitive legislative purpose of secunng presidential 
documents.166 
When discerning punitive intent, the Court has considered the 
extent to which other less burdensome alternatives were available 
to achieve the same nonpunitive objectives, but were nevertheless 
rejected by the legislature.167 However, even when other measures 
are possible, the Court usually gives deference to Congress's chosen 
means of regulating, so long as the decision was "rational and 
fairminded. "168 
Despite the obstacles to proving punitive legislative intent, 
there have been cases where the high evidentiary standard was 
met.169 In United States v. Lovett,170 for example, the Supreme 
Court found the requisite intent and struck down a congressional 
act upon evidence that included the language of the act and the 
circumstances of its passageP1 The evidence in that case showed 
that the legislature virtually conducted its own trial of the specified 
individuals with a predetermined sentence.172 In 1938, the House 
had created a Committee on Un-American Activities which con­
ducted investigations and compiled lists of people whom it believed 
were involved in subversive activities, focusing particularly on those 
working for the government.173 The head of the committee, Con­
164. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478. The "[r]eports thus cast no aspersions on appel· 
lant's personal conduct and contain no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the 
infliction of punishment." Id. at 479. 
165. See id. at 478-80. 
166. See id. at 478-79. 
167. See id. at 482-83. 
168. See id. Nixon argued that a judicial alternative whereby the Attorney Gen­
eral could bring a suit if he believed that historical presidential materials fell into the 
hands of an unreliable custodian would achieve the same ends without implicating the 
Bill of Attainder Clause. See id. at 483. Given the former President's objections to 
judicial efforts to recover the documents, the Court concluded that the Congress "might 
well have decided that the carefully tailored law ... would be less objectionable [to 
Nixon] than the alternative that he ... appear[ed] to endorse." Id. 
169. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867). 
170. 328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
171. Id. at 308-13. 
172. See id. 
173. See id. at 308. 
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gressman Dies, told the House that thirty-nine individuals, includ­
ing the three who eventually brought a claim, were not suited to 
"hold a Government position" and suggested a refusal by Congress 
to "appropriate money for their salaries."174 Eventually, the Ap­
propriations Committee determined that the three employees were 
subversives and a bill was passed to eliminate their salaries.175 The 
evidence was undeniable that Congress had decided the guilt of the 
individuals and constructed legislation that would in effect punish 
them for their subversive activities.176 As such, the Court found 
that the act constituted a bill of attainder.177 Since Lovett, no other 
bill of attainder challenge has succeeded on a finding of punitive 
legislative intent. In fact, no other bill of attainder challenge has 
been successful. 
In summary, for a finding of a bill of attainder, the Supreme 
Court requires that an act specifically target an individual for pun­
ishment. Whether an act punishes an individual in the bill of attain­
der context depends on whether the act creates a restriction 
historically regarded as punishment, has a punitive effect, or was 
enacted with the intent to punish. 
Recently, Congress enacted the Telecommunications Act of 
1996,l18 which contains a provision that singles out the BOCs and 
restricts their ability to enter the long distance and telecommunica­
tions equipment markets. The BOCs have challenged the constitu­
tionality of the Act, in part as a bill of attainder, because it 
specifically mentions the BOCs by name and places limits on their 
ability to enter lines of employment. The BOCs allege that the re­
strictions qualify as legislative punishment prohibited by the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. 
174. Id. at 309. 
175. See id. at 309-12. 
176. See id. at 309. An examination of the congressional debates revealed that 
members referred to the seriousness of the "charges" or "indictments," and discussed 
the "guilt" of the individuals. See id. Later, an Appropriations Committee held hear­
ings in which the Dies Committee presented evidence against the employees, who 
although present, were without counsel. See id. at 310-11. 
177. See id. at 316. 
178. See infra note 179. 
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II. THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996179 
A. The History and Purpose of the Act 
The District Court for the District of Columbia initially im­
posed a divestiture plan on the BOCs as part of an antitrust settle­
ment between AT&T and the United States, in the form of a 
consent decree.180 The purpose of the Consent Decree's restric­
tions was to "sever the relationship between this local monopoly 
and the other, competitive segments of AT&T, and [to] ... thus 
ensure ... that the practices which allegedly have lain heavy on the 
telecommunications industry will not recur."181 However, the com­
plexities of the AT&T divestiture and technological advances in the 
telecommunications industry demanded that the district court mon­
itor and repeatedly alter the requirements of the Consent De­
cree.182 With controversy over the increasing need for judicial 
oversight of the mandates of the Consent Decree, Congress at­
tempted to draft legislation that would resolve the inadequacies of 
the Consent Decree.183 The ultimate solution was the Telecommu­
nications Act of 1996. 
An uncodified section of the Act eliminated the prohibitions 
imposed by the Consent Decree,184 then reimposed restrictions in a 
section entitled "Special Provisions Concerning Bell Operating 
Companies" ("Special Provisions").185 In effect, the Act 
"change [ d] the administrator and specifier d] the rules by which 
Judge Greene's long-running restrictions [could] be lifted."186 
When the Act was passed, Congress made it clear that its general 
purpose was to replace telecommunications monopolies and regula­
179. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § l(a), 110 Stat. 56 
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
180. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 223 (D.D.C. 1982). 
181. See id.; see also supra notes 3-4, 6-7 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of this consent decree. 
182. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 231 (5th Cir. 1998). 
183. See id. The court noted that in his role with the Consent Decree, Judge 
Greene had significant power to determine telecommunications policy and that promi­
nent law reviews, newspapers, and business publications had named him the "telecom­
munication's czar." Id. at 231 & n.5. Congress was concerned that this could be 
considered a grant of "judicial nobility" in conflict with the Constitution, primarily, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. Id. at 231 & n.6. 
184. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601, 110 Stat. 
143. 
185. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997). 
186. SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 232. 
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tions with competitive markets.187 This would establish a "de-regu­
latory national policy framework. "188 As such, the Act would 
promote competition with the intended results being lower prices, 
greater options, and higher quality service for telecommunications 
customers.189 To achieve its goals, however, the Special Provisions 
section placed a number of restrictions on the BOCs. 
B. The Effect of the Act Provisions 190 
Among the general provisions of the Act is a requirement that 
the RBOCs, as well as other telecommunications carriers, offer 
nondiscriminatory access and interconnection to local competi­
tors191 and "negotiate in good faith with such entities."192 In addi­
tion, the Act sets forth a Special Provisions section that addresses 
the BOCs specifically and establishes criteria that the BOCs must 
meet to demonstrate that they have allowed for competition in an 
area of service before they are permitted to enter a particular mar­
ket.193 The long distance market is one such market.194 
Since the Act only requires that the BOCs meet the enumer­
ated requirements, the Act does not exclude the BOCs from the 
long distance market entirely, but rather demands that the follow­
ing requirements be met before they may offer long distance serv­
ices.195 First, a BOC must show that there is already a facilities­
based competitor present in the market.196 To do so, the BOC must 
187. See Bell Atlantic-New Jersey, Inc. v. Tate, 962 F. Supp. 608, 612 (D.N.J. 
1997). 
188. H.R. CONF. REp. No. 104-458, at 113 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
124,124. 
189. See H.R. REp. No. 104-204, at 47-48 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
10,11. 
190. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997). 
191. See id. § 251; see also Norman B. Beecher, The Telecommunications Act of 
1996: Tackling the Twists and Turns of Technology, 26 COLO. LAW. 11 (1997) (discussing 
the ambiguities raised by the terms of the Act and their implications). 
192. Tate, 962 F. Supp. at 613; see also 47 U.S.c. §§ 251(c)(1), 252 (Supp. III 
1997). 
193. See 47 U.S.c. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997). 
194. See id. § 271. 
195. See id. § 271(a). 
196. See id. § 271(c)(1)(A). A facilities-based competitor is defined as a provider 
of telephone exchange service to residential and business subscribers. See id. The Tele­
communications Act further defines telephone exchange service as: 
(A) service within a telephone exchange, or within a connected system of tele­
phone exchanges within the same exchange area operated to furnish to sub­
scribers intercommunicating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a 
single exchange, and which is covered by the exchange service charge, or (B) 
comparable service provided through a system of switches, transmission equip­
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have "entered into one or more binding agreements ... approved 
under ... [the Act, whereby] the [BOC] is providing access and 
interconnection to its [own] network facilities for the network facili­
ties of one or more unaffiliated competing providers of telephone 
exchange service ...."197 Furthermore, the Act entails a "competi­
tive checklist" that the access and interconnection service provided 
by the BOC must comply with.198 
Additionally, the BOCs may not manufacture or otherwise 
provide telecommunications or customer premises equipment un­
less already authorized by the FCC to provide long distance serv­
ices, and even then they may do so only through a separate 
affiliate.199 The Act further provides that the BOCs may not pro­
vide electronic publishing unless it is done through a separate affili­
ate.2OO Finally, the Special Provisions limit the BOCs from 
participating in alarm monitoring services. The alarm monitoring 
market is off limits to the BOCs until February 8, 2001, unless the 
BOC was already engaged in those services before November 30, 
1995.201 As for the electronic publishing market, the BOCs could 
not enter without meeting the statutory requirements until Febru­
ary 8, 2000.202 Any BOC seeking to enter a market before the spec­
ified time was required to submit an application with the FCC 
certifying that it fulfilled the requirements under the Act.203 Subse­
quently, the FCC could accept or deny the application.204 
ment, or other facilities ... by which a subscriber can originate and terminate 
a telecommunications service. 
Id. § 153(47). 
197. Id. § 271(c)(1)(A). 
198. See id. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i)-(xiv). 
199. See id. § 273(a). The BOC is permitted to collaborate with a manufacturer 
of customer premises or telecommunications equipment during the design and develop­
ment of such equipment. See id. § 273(b)(1). The BOC is also permitted to engage in 
research activities regarding the manufacturing of such equipment or enter royalty 
agreements with other manufacturers. See id. § 273(b)(2)(A)-(B). A separate affiliate 
is defined as "a corporation under common ownership or control with a Bell operating 
company that does not own or control a [BOC] and is not owned or controlled by a 
[BOC] ...." Id. § 274(i)(9). 
200. See id. § 274(a). Electronic publishing includes "the dissemination, provi­
sion, publication, or sale [of] ... news (including sports); entertainment (other than 
interactive games); business, financial, legal, consumer, or credit materials; editorials, 
columns, or features; advertising; photos or images; archival or research material; legal 
notices or public records; scientific, educational, instructional, technical, professional, 
trade, or other literary materials; or other like or similar information." Id. § 274(h)(1). 
201. See id. § 275(a)(1)-(2). 
202. See id. § 274(g)(2). 
203. See id. § 271(d)(1). 
204. See id. § 271(d)(3). 
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In 1997, the FCC denied two BOC applications for entry into 
restricted markets. The two companies that were denied entry, 
SBC Communications, Inc. and BellSouth Corp., ultimately chal­
lenged the restrictions imposed by the Special Provisions as a bill of 
attainder.205 
III. 	 THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS BEFORE THE FIFTH AND 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 
In the Fifth Circuit, the Special Provisions206 of the Telecom­
munications Act of 1996 were challenged as a bill of attainder by 
SBC Communications, Inc., ("SBC Communications"), an RBOC, 
and its subsidiaries.207 SBC Communications brought the suit after 
the FCC, which is authorized to evaluate competition in restricted 
markets before BOCs may enter, denied its application to enter an 
Oklahoma long distance market.208 The FCC contended that the 
statutory criteria under the Act had not been met.209 In the district 
court, the Special Provisions were found to be unconstitutional and 
severable from the Act,2l0 but the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
decision.211 
Earlier in 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia considered a similar bill of attainder chal­
lenge.212 BellSouth Corporation ("BellSouth"),213 like SBC Com­
munications, had filed an application with the FCC that was 
denied.214 BellSouth sought to enter the electronic publishing mar­
ket, whereas SBC Communications sought to enter the long dis­
tance market.215 Subsequently, BellSouth challenged the 
constitutionality of the Act's provision that focused on the elec­
tronic publishing market, specifically, § 274.216 This section prohib­
its a BOC from providing electronic publishing unless the BOC acts 
205. See, e.g., SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 266 (5th Cir. 1998); 
BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
206. 47 U.S.C. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997). See supra Part II.B for a discussion of 
the Special Provisions section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
207. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 233. 
208. See id. 
209. See id. 	 See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the statutory criteria. 
210. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 233. 
211. See id. 	at 247. 
212. BeliSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
213. Although BeliSouth is not a BOC, as an RBOC and sole shareholder of two 
BOCs, it had standing to bring a claim. See id. at 62. 
214. See id. 	at 60 n.1. 
215. See id. 	at 60-61. 
216. See id. 
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in conjunction with a separate affiliate or joint venture.217 Initially, 
the Consent Decree prohibited the BOCs from entering the "infor­
mation services" market, which included electronic publishing.2Is 
However, in 1991, upon motion by the Department of Justice, the 
district court lifted these restrictions.219 Ultimately, the Telecom­
munications Act reimposed some of the restrictions that had been 
lifted.220 
In both cases the RBOCs alleged that the Special Provisions 
were unconstitutional because they singled out the BOCs and in­
flicted punishment by imposing restrictions on lines of business: 
long distance service and electronic publishing.221 Both circuit 
courts nonetheless held that the Special Provisions were 
consti tutional.222 
A. The Fifth Circuit Majority Opinion: A Prophylactic Measure 
In SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC,223 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the Special 
Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 did not consti­
tute a bill of attainder.224 The court assumed that even if the Bill of 
Attainder Clause was applicable to corporations, and that the Act 
met the specificity requirement, the terms of the Special Provisions 
nevertheless did not constitute punishment within the scope of the 
Clause.225 To determine whether the Special Provisions constituted 
punishment, the court first examined the history of bills of attain­
der. Upon examining the historical meaning of punishment, the 
court determined that the Cummings and Garland cases did not 
stand for an absolute constitutional prohibition on bars to employ­
ment.226 Rather, the four-vote dissents in those cases indicated that 
the Supreme Court came close to holding that bars to employment 
would be permissible if the prohibition was intended to prevent fu­
217. 47 U.S.c. § 274(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
218. See BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 60. 
219. See id. (citing United States v. Western Electric Co., 767 F. Supp. 308 
(D.D.C. 1991), affd, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993». 
220. See id. at 61. 
221. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 233 (5th. Cir. 1998) 
(long distance services); BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 60 (electronic publishing). 
222. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 234; BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 
67. 
223. 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998). 
224. See id. at 234-35. 
225. See id. at 235. 
226. See id. at 236-37. See supra Part 1.C.2.a for a discussion of the Supreme 
Court's holdings in Cummings and Garland. 
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ture harmful acts.227 
The court focused on the regulatory role of Congress, arguing 
that cases like Dent and Hawker eventually developed the "exist­
ence of a 'prophylactic' exception to the Bill of Attainder 
Clause."228 Using language in Justice Frankfurter's dissent in 
Lovett for support, the majority found that" '[p]unishment presup­
poses . . . an act for which retribution is exacted.' "229 The court 
described subsequent attainder cases addressed by the Supreme 
Court as the "Frankfurtian phase," whereby every attainder chal­
lenge was rejected at least in part because of the "prophylactic ex­
ception."23o The court found the prophylactic exception to be 
consistent with the modem rule that "legislation [that] has a legiti­
mately nonpunitive function, purpose, and structure ... does not 
constitute punishment . . . even where it imposes the historically 
punitive sanction of barring designated individuals from engaging in 
certain professions."231 
The court also found that the cases following the Frankfurtian 
phase suggested a trend toward a broader reading of the Bill of 
Attainder Clause; however, it concluded that even in the Brown 
case, the "exception" was preserved in dicta.232 Consequently, the 
court found that whether a particular punishment has been histori­
cally regarded as implicating the Bill of Attainder Clause was not 
conclusive of whether punishment existed for purposes of the 
Clause.233 The court found that so long as an act "seeks to achieve 
legitimate and nonpunitive ends and [is] not clearly the product of 
punitive intent," it is not punishment.234 
The court found that the Special Provisions were not histori­
cally punitive since they did not permanently bar the BOCs from a 
227. See id. at 237. 
228. Id. at 237-38. See supra Part LC.2.b.ii regarding other nonpunitive 
legislation. 
229. See id. at 238 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
230. See id. at 238-39 (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1,86-88 (1961); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); De Veau v. 
Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722-23 
(1951); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 413-14 (1950)). The 
court acknowledged that some of these cases were based in part on a strict historical 
interpretation of the bill of attainder, but that all maintained the "prophylactic excep­
tion" developed by Frankfurter. See id. at 239. 
231. Id. at 241. 
232. See id. at 239-42. 
233. See id. at 241. 
234. [d. at 242 (quoting Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1071 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
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line of employment.235 Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged 
that the requirements imposed were difficult for the BOCs to sat­
isfy, it stated that compliance was not impossible.236 Furthermore, 
. the court determined that the prophylactic exception was satisfied 
by the presence of the nonpunitive goal advanced by the Special 
Provisions, namely, "ensur[ing] fair competition in the markets for 
local service, long distance, telecommunications equipment, and in­
formation services."237 The requirements would legitimately oper­
ate to decrease the risk that the BOCs would practice anti­
competitive behavior.238 
According to the majority, the third test for punishment, the 
motivational test, was also not met.239 The statutory language of 
the Special Provisions did not suggest punitive intent.24o The court 
did not find the requisite "smoking gun" evidence in the legislative 
history to suggest that Congress intended to punish the BOCs for 
past conduct.241 Instead, the court found only "isolated references 
in congressional debate to the Bell System's questionable business 
practices prior to the [Consent Decree], which were [only] offered 
as evidence of the general potential for abuse of local market 
power."242 
Finally, the court was persuaded that the Special Provisions 
could not have been intended to be punitive in light of the role that 
the BOCs played in their enactment.243 Considerable lobbying oc­
curred by the BOCs to open the markets immediately if possible, or 
restrictively if necessary, in order to avoid the harsher Consent De­
cree terms.244 The ultimate resolution, the Special Provisions, was 
"a hard-fought compromise."245 The court found that "a legislative 
quid pro quo on this level simply cannot be punitive for attainder 
235. See id. at 242-43. 
236. See id. at 243 n.27. 
237. Id. at 243 (noting that even the requirements imposed by the Consent De­
cree were not meant to be punitive). 
238. See id. at 243-44. 
239. See id. 
240. See id. at 243. 
241. See id. 
242. Id. 
243. See id. at 244. 
244. See id. at 244 n.2B. 
245. Id. at 244 (noting that the information services restriction was only partially 
reimposed under § 274; the BOCs were inlmediately free to offer incidental out-of­
region long distance service; and that the Act's ultimate goal was to remove all 
restrictions). 
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purposes."246 
B. Judge Smith's Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent in SBC Communications argued that the majority 
created the prophylactic exception on its own.247 While the dissent 
agreed that the Special Provisions specifically targeted the BOCs, it 
found that this section also constituted an unconstitutional bill of 
attainder because it punished the BOCs.248 
First, the dissent contended that the Act fell within the scope 
of historical punishment.249 Since the post-Civil War era, and as 
recently as the Supreme Court's latest finding of unconstitutionality 
on attainder grounds, the Court has held and reiterated that the Bill 
of Attainder Clause prohibits bars to various lines of employ­
ment.250 Because the historical punishment test was met, the dis­
sent suggested that the court need not examine the issue any 
further.251 Inquiries into the legislative purpose would only be nec­
essary if the historical test was not met.252 
The dissent determined that the retributive nature of an act 
alone is not dispositive in determining whether an act constitutes 
punishment.253 The fact that the provisions have preventive goals 
does not mean that the result is not unconstitutional punishment.254 
In any event, the fact that Congress singled out the BOCs to the 
exclusion of other companies undermined Congress's asserted goal 
of keeping the market anti-competitive, and instead indicated that 
Congress made a judgment that the BOCs were likely to commit 
antitrust violations and therefore inflicted punishment to prevent 
that possibility.255 The dissent, reasoning that an act may punish 
246. Id. 
247. See id. at 249 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent refers to the majority opin­
ion as "stitching together a patchwork of concurrences and dissents and by brushing 
aside binding Supreme Court majority opinions as 'aberrant' and 'unsensible'" and "an­
nounc[ing] the discovery of a heretofore unrecognized exception." Id. at 247, 249 
(Smith, J., dissenting). 
248. See id. at 248-51 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
249. See id. at 248 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
250. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
251. See id. at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting). See infra Part III.D for a discussion of 
Judge Sentelle's dissent in Bel/South Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
252. See id. at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citing Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota 
Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 853-54 (1984); Nixon v. Administrator of 
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,475-76 (1977)). 
253. See id. at 250-51 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
254. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
255. See id. at 251 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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even if it is avoidable, also rejected the theory that since Congress 
afforded the BOCs a means of complying with the Act, the bar 
from employment was nonpunitive.256 Consequently, the "prophy­
lactic exception" is a "chimera" because legislation punishing indi­
viduals who are likely to do wrong constitutes a bill of attainder, 
even though it is prophylactic.257 
Lastly, the dissent argued that the separation of powers princi­
ple underlying the Bill of Attainder Clause would be undermined 
unless the Special Provisions of the Act were considered a bill of 
attainder, since the legislature would be performing a judicial role 
by imposing punishment on the BOCS.258 According to the dissent, 
it is irrelevant whether the BOCs played a role in enacting the bill 
given the significance of this doctrine.259 
C. The District of Columbia Circuit Majority Opinion 
Like the Fifth Circuit, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia also held that there was no bill of attainder 
violation.260 First, the court assumed BelISouth had standing as a 
corporation to bring a bill of attainder claim.261 However, unlike 
the Fifth Circuit, the court in BellSouth addressed the specificity 
requirement.262 The court found that this requirement was met 
since the BOCs were specifically mentioned by name in the Special 
Provisions.263 The court went on to conclude, however, that the 
Act did not punish the BOCs.264 
As in SBC Communications, the court rejected the BOC's as­
sertion that the restrictions constituted punishment historically for­
bidden by the Bill of Attainder Clause.265 The court reasoned that 
the bill of attainder cases finding legislative bars from employment 
to be punishment were unique and could be separated into two 
256. See id. at 248-49 (Smith, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause can­
not be avoided simply by inserting into the statute a means of escape."). 
257. See id. at 251 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
258. See id. at 252 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
259. See id. at 253 (Smith, J., dissenting). The dissent analogized the consent of 
the BOCs to consent to subject-matter jurisdiction. The legislation is unenforceable 
irrespective of consent simply because it is a bill of attainder and Congress lacks the 
power to create it. See id. (Smith, J., dissenting). 
260. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 63-67 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
261. See id. at 63. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
264. See id. at 64-67. 
265. See id. at 64. 
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groupS.266 First were the cases that dealt with ex-Confederates: 
Cummings and Garland; and second were the cas~s that involved 
Communists.267 The common theme was that all four bills singled 
out specific classes of persons based on their political beliefs.268 
According to the court, business restrictions such as those imposed 
by § 274 of the Special Provisions could not constitute punishment 
in a historical sense because the BOCs are not analogous to ex­
Confederates or members of the Communist Party, who were sin­
gled out for their political beliefs.269 
Furthermore, any claim of historical punishment was under­
mined by the fact that § 274 did not create a complete bar from 
electronic publishing.27o Rather, it only required BellSouth to 
restructure its method of entering the market by using a separate 
affiliate.271 The court found that such restructuring is not a suffi­
cient restriction to rise to the level of a traditional restraint on 
employment.272 
According to the Bel/South court, the second prong of the pun­
ishment test, the functional test, was the most important, because it 
operates to prevent Congress from devising methods of legislative 
punishment that have not been deemed to be punishment in a his­
torical sense.273 In addition, the functional test allows a court to 
conclude that an act, despite a historic classification as punishment, 
is not violative of the Bill of Attainder Clause given its nonpunitive 
goalS.274 
The court determined that § 274, despite its specificity, was "a 
rather conventional response to commonly perceived risks of anti­
competitive behavior."275 In fact, the court could find no authority 
266. See id. 
267. See id. 
268. See id. at 64-65; see also Tun Sloan, Creating Better Incentives Through Regu­
lation: Section 271 of the Communications Act of1934 and the Promotion of Local Ex­
change Competition, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 309, 321 (1998) (noting that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause seems "intended to protect individuals and groups from being singled 
out for punishment because of their beliefs or political affiliations"); Note, Beyond Pro­
cess: A Substantive Rationale for the Bill ofAttainder Clause, 70 VA. L. REv. 475 (1984) 
(arguing for a restructuring of the Bill of Attainder inquiry to recognize the Clause's 
purpose of protecting against punishment based on one's political activity or belief). 
269. See BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 65. 
270. See id. 
271. See id. 
272. See id. 
273. See id. 
274. See id. 
275. Id. 
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that required it to consider specificity as part of its punishment 
analysis.276 In addition, the court found that BellSouth's assertion 
of punitive purpose was undermined by § 274's location in a larger 
act with a nonpunitive goal of promoting a competitive telecommu­
nications market.277 
The court also rejected the view that Congress did not have a 
rational reason for imposing § 274 other than to punish.278 Instead, 
it was likely that Congress, looking at the same evidence that com­
pelled the district court to lift the information services ban, had 
concluded that the BOCs' ability to monopolize the electronic pub­
lishing market had to be limited.279 The court also gave weight to 
the fact that the Special Provisions section was not as severe as the 
restrictions formerly placed on the BOCs by the Consent Decree in 
concluding that the Act did not have a punitive purpose.280 The 
court contended that it was not applying a rational basis test to the 
attainder claim to determine congressional purpose.281 Instead, the 
court required a rationalization that was "not merely reasonable, 
but nonpunitive. "282 The court was also not persuaded by the argu­
ment that § 274 was punitive in nature because it did not apply 
equally to all local exchange carriers.283 The court reasoned that 
the singling out of the BOCs from all carriers could have been Con­
gress's response to the BOCs' pervasiveness in the local service 
markets, which created a greater risk of anticompetitive 
behavior.284 
Finally, the court briefly dealt with the third punishment test 
and found that it also was not met.285 In order for the legislative 
intent test to be satisfied, BellSouth needed to show "unmistakable 
276. See id. at 64. 
277. See id. at 66. 
278. See id. 
279. See id. 
280. See id. at 66 (noting that section 274 only applies to electronic publishing and 
terminates in five years, whereas the Decree was broader and could last indefinitely, 
and that the Special Provisions only require restructuring of the BOCs before entering 
the markets, not an absolute exclusion from the markets). 
281. See id. at 66-67. 
282. Id. Under the rational basis test, the most lenient standard of review, "legis­
lation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the 
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
283. See BeliSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 67. 
284. See id. 
285. See id. 
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evidence of punitive intent."286 According to the court, the "few 
scattered remarks referring to anticompetitive abuses allegedly 
committed by the BOCs in the past" could not establish the requi­
site legislative intent.287 
D. Judge Sentelle's Dissenting Opinion 
Like the Fifth Circuit dissent, the dissent in BellSouth found 
that the Special Provisions' § 274 constituted legislative punishment 
and therefore was unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.288 
The dissent first argued that little more than specificity is 
needed to constitute punishment.289 Still, even if specificity alone 
was not enough to create a bill of attainder, the dissent argued that 
a preliminary finding of historical punishment in addition to the 
specificity of the Act should be sufficient to conclude that the Act is 
unconstitutional.290 The dissent found that, in accordance with 
Supreme Court precedent, legislative bars from employment consti­
tuted prohibited legislative punishment under the historical test.291 
Addressing the second prong of the punishment test, which de­
termines whether a nonpunitive legislative purpose exists, the dis­
sent again took into account the specificity of the Act, since 
according to Judge Sentelle, specificity is indicative of a punitive 
purpose.292 In fact, if it were not for the unique holding in Nixon, 
where the former President was found to constitute a legitimate 
class of one, it would be unnecessary to engage in a punishment 
analysis in this case because the mere "imposition of a burden 
solely on a class of individuals defined by name rather than by char­
acteristic ... on its face bespeaks an intent to punish ...."293 Ac­
cording to Judge Sentelle, since the BOCs were specifically named 
in the Act, to the exclusion of other similarly situated companies, it 
could be inferred that the Act was designed to punish the BOCs for 
286. Id. (quoting Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 
468 U.S. 841, 855-56 n.15 (1984) (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 u.S. 603, 619 
(1960))). 
287. Id. 
288. See id. at 71-74 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
289. See id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
290. See id. at 71-73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
291. See id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). The court determined that legislative 
bars to employment were the most common kind of statute struck down by the 
Supreme Court as bills of attainder. See id. at 72-73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
292. See id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
293. Id. at 72 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
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their past behavior.294 As a result, the Act failed the second prong 
of the test despite the existence of any asserted nonpunitive goal.295 
Instead of naming the BOCs, Judge Sentelle suggested that Con­
gress should have defined its focus in general terms to include "the 
characteristics of local exchange carriers that create the risks of an­
ticompetitive behavior."296 The Act also constituted punishment 
regarding the information services provisions because it presented a 
reimposition of restrictions that had already been lifted under the 
regime of the Consent Decree.297 
Finally, the Bel/South dissent considered the motivational fac­
tor, which it regarded as the "least important" factor.298 Neverthe­
less, the dissent took a broad approach to determine legislative 
intent and found that the legislative record suggested that Congress 
acted with the requisite intent to punish the BOCs.299 Although 
remarks made during the Telecommunications Act's enactment 
were not alone evidence of punitive intent,3oo a congressional mo­
tive to punish could be discerned when the remarks were consid­
ered in light of the Act's specificity and its "timing and apparent 
triggering."301 Both the SBC Communications and Bel/South dis­
sents contained strong arguments that viewed the restrictions im­
posed by the Special Provisions as unconstitutional under the Bill of 
Attainder Clause. Ultimately, however, both the Fifth Circuit and 
the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Special Provisions 
and § 274 of those provisions are not violative of the Bill of Attain­
der Clause. 
IV. THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONSTITUTE A BILL 

OF ArrAINDER 

There are three potential obstacles to finding that the Special 
Provisions section of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 consti­
tutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder: (1) corporate standing, 
294. See id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
295. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
296. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). It should be noted that the Special Provisions 
do not apply to other local exchange carriers such as GTE Corporation and Southern 
New England Telephone, even though GTE was subject to a less restrictive consent 
decree prior to the Act. See id. at 67 & n.9. 
297. See id. at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting); SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 
F.3d 226, 232 (5th Cir. 1998). 
298. See BellSouth Corp., 144 F.3d at 73 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
299. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
300. See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
301. Id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting). 
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(2) specificity, and (3) punishment. The first two are easily satis­
fied. Indeed, the only serious issue is whether the Special Provi­
sions section constitutes punishment in the Bill of Attainder 
context. 
A. 	 A Corporation Has the Required Standing to Invoke the Bill 
of Attainder Clause 
The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether a corporation 
has standing to assert a Bill of Attainder claim.302 However, it is 
likely that a corporation would have the requisite standing.303 Not 
only does recent dicta suggest that the Bill of Attainder Clause's 
protections would extend to corporations,304 but the Supreme 
Court has consistently included corporations within the scope of 
other constitutional protections.305 
A corporation is "an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and 
existing only in contemplation of law."306 Thus, whether a corpora­
tion is entitled to the protection of a constitutional guarantee de­
pends on the nature of the guarantee at issue.307 Specifically, 
purely personal guarantees are unavailable to a corporation be­
cause the "'historic function' of ... [such] guarantee[s] has been 
limited to the protection of individuals."308 Whether a guarantee is 
"purely personal" turns on "the nature, history, and purpose of the 
302. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 234 n.ll (5th Cir. 
1998). 
303. See id.; BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
304. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 234 & n.ll (citing Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995), which suggested that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause is implicated when laws affect "a single individual or firm"); see also 
George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 U.S. 286, 290 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissent­
ing) (stating that when a law "blacklists this family corporation," it has the same effect 
as a bill of attainder). 
305. Indeed, as early as 1819 the Supreme Court recognized that corporations 
have constitutionally protected contract rights and that corporate franchises can only be 
forfeited by trial and judgement. See, e.g., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Wood­
ward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). For a list of other cases in which the Court has 
allowed corporations to assert constitutional protections see infra note 312. 
The Court has also criticized the British Parliament for operating on the theory 
that it was "omnipotent," and could therefore exercise "extraordinary power" to create 
and destroy corporations. See Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U.S. 679, 684 (1877). The 
Special Provisions do not threaten to destroy the BOCs; however, if allowed, they 
would constitute an unchecked legislative power that could lead to more serious depri­
vations with the potential to destroy corporations in the future. 
306. 	 Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 636. 
307. 	 See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
308. 	 Ill. at 778 n.14 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944)). 
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particular constitutional provision. "309 
However, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,310 the 
Supreme Court stated that this analysis does not leave the govern­
ment "free to define the rights of [corporations] without constitu­
tional limit. Otherwise, corporations could be denied the 
protection of all constitutional guarantees ...."311 Consequently, 
many constitutional guarantees have been afforded to 
corporations.312 
At least two Supreme Court Justices have suggested that a con­
stitutional provision may apply to a corporation notwithstanding an 
extensive history as a prohibition applicable to individuals. In 
Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,313 the 
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
against excessive fines does not apply between private parties, and 
declined to consider whether the constitutional provision is also ap­
plicable to corporations.314 However, Justices O'Connor and Ste­
vens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, addressed the 
corporate standing issue and found that a corporation could invoke 
the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.315 Their 
opinion indicates that if the Supreme Court were to consider the 
applicability of a constitutional provision to a corporation, more 
than the mere historical fact that a constitutional provision has been 
used primarily for individual protection may be required to find 
that the provision is a "purely personal" guarantee. 
Justices O'Connor and Stevens discussed the history of the Ex­
cessive Fines Clause at length (which parallels the history of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause) as a limitation on the government's ability to 
309. Id. 
310. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
311. Id. at 778 n.14. 
312. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) 
(equal protection); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) 
(due process); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (searches and seizures); 
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977) (double jeopardy); Vir­
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976) (freedom of speech). But see, e.g., George Campbell Painting Corp. v. Reid, 392 
U.S. 286, 288-89 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination cannot be invoked by a corporation (quoting United 
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-99 (1944»); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 
U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (finding no right to privacy). 
313. 492 U.S. 257 (1989). 
314. See id. at 276 n.22. 
315. See id. at 284-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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punish and deter the conduct of individuals .316 Still, Justices 
O'Connor and Stevens maintained that a corporation should be en­
titled to claim the constitutional protection at issue in part because 
a corporate entity would be capable of paying an excessive mone­
tary fine (as opposed to, for example, remaining silent under the 
Fifth Amendment).317 
Likewise, in the Bill of Attainder context, a corporation would 
be capable of being punished, at least where the punishment con­
sists of a fine or ban from a line of employment. Additional 
Supreme Court decisions regarding the applicability of constitu­
tional provisions to corporations also suggests that the Court is not 
concerned with who or what the provisions historically applied 
to.318 Rather, the Court is concerned with the historical purpose of 
the provision and whether corporate protection serves that 
purpose.319 
Furthermore, because the Bill of Attainder Clause is a "safe­
guard against legislative exercise of the judicial function[,] or more 
simply-trial by legislature," and corporations are subject to crimi­
nal law, it is only natural that the prohibition against legislative 
punishments be applicable to corporations.32o Thus, whether the 
Bill of Attainder Clause provides a protection that is historically 
personal in nature is beyond the scope of this Note, it is likely that 
the Clause would be applicable to corporations and could be in­
voked by the BOCs. 
B. 	 The Special Provisions Operate with Unprecedented 
Specificity 
The first prong of the Bill of Atainder inquiry requires that an 
act operate with specificity.321 Undoubtedly, the Telecommunica­
tions Act of 1996 singles out the BOCs. It does so in two ways. 
316. See id. at 286-97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(discussing the history of the Excessive Fines Clause). 
317. 	 See id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
318. See, e.g., Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 
(1986) (emphasizing that "[c]orporations ... like individuals, contribute to the 'discus­
sion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas'" that the First Amend­
ment is designed to protect, and thus, are entitled to First Amendment protection 
(quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978))). 
319. 	 See id. 
320. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1003 n.4 (N.D. Tex. 
1997) (quoting United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (alteration in origi­
nal», rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998). 
321. 	 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,468-72 (1977). 
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First, the statutory language of the Act targets the BOCs by naming 
them generally.322 The relevant sections are entitled: "Special Pro­
visions Concerning Bell Operating Companies. "323 The Act also 
targets the BOCs with specificity by naming each company individ­
ually.324 Such specificity is virtually unprecedented.325 
Still, the specific naming of an individual or entity by an act 
alone does not necessarily satisfy the specificity requirement.326 In 
Nixon, the Court provided that the Bill of Attainder Clause "was 
not intended to serve as a variant of the equal protection doctrine, 
invalidating every Act ... that legislatively burdens some persons 
or groups but not all other plausible individuals."327 As such, a leg­
islative act could single out an individual if the "focus of the enact­
ment can be fairly and rationally understood" as requiring such 
specificity.328 
In Nixon, the nature of the act demonstrated that only former 
President Nixon possessed materials that were the focus of the leg­
islation.329 However, in the case of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, numerous other corporations also pose a risk of anticompeti­
tive behaviors yet are not included in the terms of the Act's Special 
322. See 47 u.s.c. §§ 271-276 (Supp. III 1997). 
323. Id. 
324. See id. § 153. This section provides that: 

The term 'Bell operating company' (A) means any of the following companies: 

Bell Telephone Company of Nevada, Illinois Bell Telephone Company, Indi­

ana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell Telephone Com­
pany, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, New Jersey Bell 
Telephone Company, New York Telephone Company, US West Communica­
tions Company, South Central Bell Telephone Company, Southern Bell Tele­
phone and Telegraph Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, The 
Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, The Chesapeake and Potomac Tel­
ephone Company, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of 
Maryland, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia, 
The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West Virginia, The Dia­
mond State Telephone Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, The 
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company .... 
Id. § 153(4). 
325. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting). 
326. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471-72. See generally Comment, The Bounds of Leg­
islative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE 
L.J. 330, 349-54 (1962) (arguing that when empirical evidence is necessary to decide 
whether a broad rule applies to specific persons, then such a decision cannot be man­
dated through legislation; however, when the judgment is definitional, more specific 
legislation is permissible). 
327. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted). 
328. Id. at 472. 
329. See id. See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of Nixon. 
311 2000] REGULATION OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT 
Provisions section.330 
Accordingly, given the likelihood that the Bill of Attainder 
Clause is available to corporations and that the Act operates with 
unprecedented specificity, the primary obstacle to the BOCs' claim 
that the Telecommunications Act's Special Provisions section is .a 
bill of attainder depends on the definition of punishment. 
C. The Three-Part Test for Punishment and Its Limitations 
The Supreme Court has articulated a three-part punishment 
analysis for bill of attainder purposes.331 The first test asks whether 
the legislation in question has been historically regarded as punish­
ment.332 The second test considers whether the legislation is "puni­
tive."333 The third test examines whether the legislature intended 
to punish a specified group or individual,334 However, in part be­
cause the Bill of Attainder Clause has rarely been litigated, and in 
part because the significance of each prong has riever been suffi­
ciently articulated, the meaning of punishment in the bill of attain­
der context remains unclear. I . 
1. The Historical Test 
For bill of attainder purposes, the Supreme Court has repeat­
edly examined whether an alleged punishment is punishment in a 
historical sense.335 Legislative acts that impose death, banishment, 
imprisonment, or bans on various lines of employment historically 
have been prohibited by the Bill of Attainder Clause.336 The limita­
tions on the BOCs entering long distance and communications 
equipment markets basically exclude the BOCs from lines of busi­
ness and therefore should be considered historically prohibited.337 
330. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Tex. 
1997) (noting that there are hundreds of local exchange carriers and several sizeable 
local companies that are wholly unaffiliated with the BOCs), rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th 
Cir.1998). 
331. See supra Part I.C.2 for a discussion of the development and requirement of 
each prong of the test. 
332. See supra Part I.C.2.a for a discussion of the first test. 
333. See supra Part I.C.2.b for a discussion of the second test. 
334. See supra Part I.C.2.c for a discussion of the third test. 
335. See, e.g., Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 
468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984); Nixon V. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473 
(1977). 
336. See, e.g., Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474-75 (citing United States V. Brown, 381 U.S. 
437 (1965); United States V. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings V. Missouri, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 277 (1867». 
337. See SBC Communications, Inc. V. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 251 (5th Cir. 1998) 
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The historical test may be regarded as a preliminary bill of at­
tainder inquiry. When satisfied, the test provides an immediate red 
flag that an act of Congress is inflicting punishment. The test is 
effective because it defines punishment in terms of the methods by 
which the legislature, both here and in England, had traditionally 
condemned individuals or groups for their past actions. Legislated 
banishment, imprisonment, and bans from lines of employment 
have traditionally constituted unconstitutional legislative 
punishment. 
However, this inquiry is not effective solely because the partic­
ular type of punishment has been historically regarded as contrary 
to the Bill of Attainder Clause. Rather, the test is effective because 
it is a simplified means of determining if the underlying objective of 
the bill of attainder prohibition, the separation of the legislative and 
judicial branches of government, is compromised. This fundamen­
tal separation of powers objective has been asserted from the time 
of Hamilton and has persisted in the relevant Supreme Court deci­
sions.338 Given the significance of the separation of powers doc­
trine, the historical inquiry should not be easily dismissed. 
However, both the SBC Communications and Bel/South majorities 
have disregarded the importance of the historical test.339 The fram­
ers would not have intended for the definition of punishment to be 
interpreted so narrowly.340 The historical punishment test is an ef­
fective means of ensuring that the legislature has not infringed upon 
the judiciary's duties.341 
Still, the historical test is not determinative of punishment. 
First, the historical test is under-inclusive. An act may constitute 
punishment even though it has not been historically regarded as 
such because a creative legislature can always draft legislation that 
falls outside the category of traditional historical punishments, yet 
(Smith, J., dissenting); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sen­
telle, J., dissenting). 
338. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 245-46; see also THE FEDERAL. 
1ST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), No. 44 (James Madison). See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. 
at 443-46. 
339. See supra Parts III.A and III.C, respectively, for a discussion of how these 
majorities have avoided the historical test. 
340. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 442 (stating that "[w]hile history thus provides some 
guidelines ... the proper scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause and its relevance to 
contemporary problems, must ultimately be sought by attempting to discern the reasons 
for its inclusion in the Constitution, and the evils it was designed to eliminate"). 
341. See id. at 442, 443-46 ("[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended ... as ... 
a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function or more simply­
trial by legislature."). 
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nonetheless punishes a specified individual or group.342 In the 
words of Madison, the people of America "have seen with regret 
and with indignation, that sudden changes and legislative interfer­
ences in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of 
enterprizing [sic] and influential speculators; and snares to the more 
industrious and less informed part of the community."343 As a re­
sult, the historical punishment test alone cannot address the risk of 
legislative infringements on the judiciary. 
Secondly, the historical test can only be one step of the punish­
ment analysis since a restriction that is historically regarded as pun­
ishment is not automatically violative of the Bill of Attainder 
Clause. For example, in Hawker v. New York 344 and Dent v. West 
Virginia,345 the Supreme Court held that qualification standards 
that operate to exclude certain individuals from certain occupations 
do not constitute legislative punishment when the qualifications are 
reasonably related to the occupations.346 To limit the risk of crea­
tive punishment and avoid narrowing legislative regulatory powers, 
the Court has defined the Bill of Attainder more broadly than just 
the historical sense.347 
Years after Hawker and Dent, the Supreme Court developed a 
test of punishment that might better identify when a legislative act 
constitutes punishment: the functional test.348 For the Bill of At­
tainder Clause to remain effective as an additional check to secure 
the balance of powers between the legislature and the judiciary, the 
"functional test" for punishment must also be considered. 
2. The Not-So-Functional Functional Test 
Virtually every bill of attainder case that has come before the 
Supreme Court has ultimately, if not explicitly, attempted to make 
a distinction between permissible preventive regulation and uncon­
342. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 250 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
343. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 227 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). 
344. 170 U.S. 189 (1898). 
345. 129 U.S. 114 (1889). 
346. See supra Part I.C.2.bj for a discussion of Hawker and Dent. 
347. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (stating that a bill of 
attainder "affect[s] the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do 
both"); see also United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,447 (1965) (stating that the Bill of 
Attainder Clause should be "read in light of the evil the Framers had sought to bar"). 
348. See infra note 352 and accompanying text for a description of the functional 
test. 
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stitutional legislative punishment.349 However, members of the 
Court have disagreed as to the nature of the distinction. For exam­
ple, Justice Frankfurter opined that punishment, for purposes of the 
Bill of Attainder Clause, requires an act to be wholly retributive to 
be unconstitutionaP50 The Brown Court, on the other hand, stated 
that punishment could have additional purposes aside from retribu­
tion, such as deterrence or rehabilitation, and still fall within the 
scope of the Bill of Attainder Clause.351 
The functional test is an attempt to determine whether chal­
lenged legislation can reasonably be said to further nonpunitive 
purposes when viewed in terms of the type and severity of the bur­
dens imposed.352 Of the three tests for punishment, this test most 
effectively addresses the issue at the core of a bill of attainder 
claim-whether the legislative act is punitive. This test does not 
attempt to ascertain whether Congress has a good reason to punish, 
since the separation of powers doctrine clearly prohibits Congress 
from legislating punishment.353 Once it has been determined that 
Congress has punished, the inquiry should end. 
The majorities in SBC Communications and BellSouth sug­
gested that legislative punishment is permissible so long as Con­
gress legislates within the "prophylactic exception."354 According 
to their reasoning, if Congress attempted to prevent a future harm 
through the use of an employment ban, the ban would be allowed 
regardless of its specificity. However, the prevention of future 
harms does not provide an exception to the rule that specific legisla­
tive punishment is unconstitutional. If cases like Hawker and Dent 
represent an exception, then specific legislation that punishes would 
be permissible so long as it is also preventive. This result poses two 
problems. 
First, the majorities' conclusions undermine the separation of 
349. See, e.g., Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-60; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
350. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 324. 
351. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 458-60. 
352. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76 (1977); see 
also Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 96-97 (1958); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189,193-94 (1898); Dent v. West 
Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 319-20 
(1867). 
353. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447. See supra Part LB for a discussion of the sepa­
ration of powers doctrine. 
354. See supra Part lILA and IILC, respectively, for a discussion of the courts' 
application of the "prophylactic exception." 
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powers doctrine because the legislature, instead of the courts, 
would be making a determination of guilt and imposing punish­
ment.355 Secondly, in United States v. Brown,356 the Court held that 
the assertion of a legitimate governmental interest alone does not 
remove an act from the reach of the Bill of Attainder Clause.357 
Because punishment often has the dual function of retribution and 
prevention, preventive aspects of a legislative act cannot save it 
from bill of attainder status.358 The Court stressed the significance 
of the specificity of an act, regardless of whether it purports to pre­
vent future harms, because Congress could otherwise avoid the Bill 
of Attainder Clause by simply asserting a preventive goal.359 The 
legislature can always hypothecate an acceptable basis for legisla­
tion. Indeed, SBC Communications is a prime example of where 
"the punishment comes cloaked in the mantle of prophylactic eco­
nomic regulation."36o 
Congress cannot single out an individual or group when it cre­
ates a standard of conduct to meet preventive goals if the legislation 
operates to punish that individual or groUp.361 Still, Congress may 
achieve preventive goals if in enacting legislation it relies upon the 
"general knowledge of human psychology" and reaches all men.362 
Therefore, the mere prevention of future harms is not an exception 
to otherwise unconstitutional legislative punishment. The goal of 
preventing future harms has only been an acceptable explanation 
for an alleged bill of attainder when an act operates with a generally 
applicable definition.363 This can only be done by Congress when 
the rule applied is a "rule of universal application."364 
Rather than establishing an exception to the Bill of Attainder 
355. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of the separation of powers doctrine in 
the context of the Bill of Attainder Clause. See also Brown, 381 U.S. 437 at 442-46. 
356. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
357. See id. at 458-61. 
358. See id. 
359. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 250 (5th. Cir. 1998) 
(Smith, J., dissenting). 
360. Id. at 253 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
361. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 447. 
362. Id. at 454. 
363. See Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control 
Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 88 (1961) (determining that the language of the act described "a class of 
activity" and not the Communist Party itself or its members); Hawker v. New York, 170 
U.S. 189, 197 (1898) (finding that the description of "ex-felons" was permissible be­
cause it was in the legislature's power "to prescribe a rule of general application based 
upon a state of things which is ordinarily evidence of the ultimate fact sought to be 
established"). 
364. Hawker, 170 U.S. at 197. 
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Clause, Hawker and Dent exemplify the Court's first attempts to 
distinguish between legislation that punishes and permissible pre­
ventive regulation. In those cases, the Court concluded that absent 
other evidence, reasonable qualification standards do not constitute 
punishment and thus are not unconstitutionaP65 
3. The Legislative Purpose 
The third test for punishment is the legislative intent test.366 
This test correctly assumes that a legislatively created restriction or 
requirement is more likely to constitute punishment if the legisla­
ture's purpose was to punish. However, the effectiveness of the 
third test for determining whether a statute punishes is questiona­
ble.367 An analysis of congressional motive in the case of the BOCs 
is a good example of why the effectiveness is questionable. The 
legislative history of the Act does not include remarks indicating 
that the Special Provisions section was established to punish the 
BOCs, but rather, indicates that the legislature acted with a 
nonpunitive goaP68 The days of obvious improper legislative in­
tent, such as in Lovett,369 may be long gone. To the extent that the 
American public is allowed an inside view of its legislatures and is 
kept abreast of the passage of new laws, it is unlikely that we would 
see the kind of remarks today that the majority requires in order to 
find a bill of attainder. Theoretically, Congress could mask the pu­
nitive nature of an act by avoiding negative remarks and articulat­
ing popular preventive goals. Consequently, a determination of 
legislative intent should not be based solely on the absence of con­
gressional remarks. If legislative intent is to be inquired into, 
weight should also be given to the circumstances surrounding the 
enactment of a law, such as its timing and effect.370 
D. 	 A Proposed Test for Punishment Under the Bill of Attainder 
Clause 
Neither the historical test nor the legislative purpose test by 
365. 	 See supra Part I.C.2.b.i for a discussion of Hawker and Dent. 
366. 	 See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977). 
367. See, e.g., Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886, 890 (D.C. Cir. 
1992) ("At its best, legislative history is an undependable guide to the meaning of a 
statute. "). 
368. See supra Parts III.A and III.C for a discussion of how the SBC Communica­
tions and BellSouth courts interpreted the legislative history of the act. 
369. 	 See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lovett. 
370. See BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., 
dissenting). 
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itself is sufficient to evaluate whether a legislative act constitutes a 
bill of attainder.371 Moreover, the functional test for punishment 
has proven inadequate.372 Each test attempts to ascertain whether 
an act constitutes "punishment" when in fact that term has re­
mained elusive.373 
Because the legislature's intent may not be clear, and because 
historical punishments may be deemed necessary to prevent future 
harms, it is necessary to define punishment in terms of the primary 
aim of an act. If the primary aim of an act is its asserted preventive 
purpose, it does not constitute punishment in the bill of attainder 
context.374 Consequently, factors taken into account under the 
usual three-part punishment test remain relevant to determine the 
primary aim of an act. These factors may include whether an act 
historically constitutes punishment and whether evidence of the leg­
islature's punitive intent exists. 
However, the most significant factor to gauge when an act has 
both punitive and preventive aspects is the specificity of the act.375 
When an individual or group is adversely affected by an act, but 
does not constitute a "legitimate class of one," a court should deter­
mine whether the terms of the act are sufficiently general so as to 
create an objective standard that does not condemn a particular 
group based on past acts.376 
In the BOCs' case, the fact that Congress specifically targeted 
the BOCs by name is indicative of the punitive nature of the Act.377 
Unless an individual or entity constitutes a legitimate class of one, 
as in the case of former President Nixon, there can be no legitimate 
reason for singling it out,378 Therefore, any proposed reason to tar­
371. See supra Parts IV.C.l and IV.C.3 for a discussion of the historical and legis­
lative purpose tests. 
372. See supra Part IV.C.2 for a discussion of the functional test. 
373. See Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J .. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771 (1998), for a criticism of the Supreme Court for failing to 
make a clear distinction between prevention and punishment under the Ex Post Facto 
and Double Jeopardy Clauses. 
374. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960). 
375. See Note, supra 60, arguing for a finding of bill of attainder based on speci­
ficity alone. 
376. See supra Part I.C.1 for a discussion of the specificity requirement in light of 
Nixon. See also infra note 378 for a comment on Nixon. 
377. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226, 251 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(Smith, J., dissenting); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 53, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sen­
telle, J., dissenting). See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the specificity of the Tele­
communications Act. 
378. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977). More­
over, laws are already in place that prohibit anti-competitive practices. Specifically, the 
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get an individual or defined group should also apply to others simi­
larly situated.379 In this case, Congress has asserted that there is a 
legitimate concern for keeping communications markets competi­
tive.380 However, the BOCs are not the only local service provid­
ers.381 If the free market goal truly underlies the Special 
Provisions, Congress would have also intended it to apply to those 
other providers. Because other providers were not included within 
the scope of the Act, it can be inferred that the intent of Congress 
must have gone beyond preventive measures. More likely, Con­
gress considered the past conduct of the BOCs, determined that 
their behavior was not properly restricted by the courts, and re­
stricted the BOCs from the possibility of carrying on the behavior 
again by prohibiting them from entering various markets. 
Although the absence of a means of escape has sometimes 
b~en considered a criterion for a punitive act,382 the lack of a means 
of escape is not determinative of punishment.383 Nevertheless, it is 
one indicator of how specifically an act operates. If one cannot 
evade the operation of a legislatively enacted employment bar, then 
it is more likely to be specific. On the other hand, if an escape 
route does exist, it may be evidence that the statute is not legislat­
ing with regard to a specific group or individual, but is instead fo­
cusing on a general characteristic.384 In this case, however, the Act 
does not focus on one general characteristic, but rather, it clearly 
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2 (1994), provides that monopolizing or conspiring 
to monopolize any part of trade or commerce between the states is a felony punishable 
by a fine not exceeding $10 million if committed by a corporation. See also United 
States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1321-22 (D.D.C. 1978) (finding AT&T subject to the 
Sherman Antitrust Act notwithstanding the fact that the telecommunications industry is 
a regulated industry (quoting Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 
(1945))). 
379. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 449 n.23, 450 (1965). 
380. See supra Parts III.A and III.C for a discussion of the lower courts' treat­
ment of congressional intent. 
381. See SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996, 1001 (N.D. Tex. 
1997) (noting that there are hundreds of local exchange carriers and several sizeable 
local companies that are wholly unaffiliated with the BOCs), rev'd, 154 F.3d 226 (5th 
Cir.1998). 
382. See supra Part I.C.2.b.ii for a discussion of non-punitive legislation. 
383. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 456-57 & n.32. Even assuming that the presence of a 
means of escape is significant independent of specificity, it is arguable that the BOCs do 
not have a means of escape. Nothing can change the fact that the BOCs are subject to 
the Act. The only ways for them to enter the restricted lines of business are to comply 
with its terms or wait it out. In either case, a potential financial gain is forfeited. See 
SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 243 n.27. It is in the BOCs' best "economic and 
business interest" to meet the criteria. Id. 
384. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 454-55. 
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specifies the BOCs by name.385 
The majority in SBC Communications determined that the 
Special Provisions section does not constitute a prohibited bar 
against employment because the restrictions are only for a limited 
time and compliance is possible.386 However, a requirement of a 
"perpetual bar" is not the current state of the law.387 In United 
States v. Brown,388 the Supreme Court rejected the notion that ines­
capability is a prerequisite for the Bill of Attainder Clause.389 Had 
Congress acted to imprison an individual for five years, there would 
be no question that the action would be a bill of attainder even 
though the restriction has a definite end. Similarly, if an individual 
was allowed to perform community service to avoid the sentence, it 
would still be legislative punishment. Indeed, "[the Constitution] 
intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against dep­
rivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, 
however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of 
the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and 
futile proceeding."390 Consequently, the BOCs should not be de­
nied the protection of the Bill of Attainder Clause simply because 
Congress has left the BOCs with an escape, albeit an "onerous" 
one.391 
The second significant factor to consider when determining the 
primary aim of a legislative act addresses the requirement that a bill 
of attainder must be punishment without the benefit of a judicial 
trial.392 As explained above, a case where legislative proceedings 
parallel adjudicative judicial proceedings would be rare today.393 
Still, a court can and should consider the extent to which a past 
act or political affiliation can be associated with an individual or 
group targeted by questionable legislation.394 When such a rela­
tionship is present, it can be inferred that Congress constructed the 
385. See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of the specificity requirement. 
386. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 242-43. 
387. See iii. at 248-49 (Smith J., dissenting). 
388. 381 U.S. 437 (1965). 
389. See iii. at 457 n.32. See also supra note 155 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Brown. 
390. Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,325 (1867). 
391. See SBC Communications, Inc., 154 F.3d at 243 n.27. See supra note 383 for 
the proposition that the BOCs do not have a means of escape. 
392. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). 
393. See supra Part IV.C.3 for an analysis of congressional motive in theory and 
application. 
394. See supra note 268 and accompanying text for a discussion of legislation that 
singled out individuals or groups based on their political beliefs. 
320 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:271 
legislation with either a real or perceived reason to punish the per­
son or group. The closer the relationship, and thus the stronger the 
inference, the more likely it is that Congress instituted punishment 
by legislative action. In the BOCs' case, there is no political affilia­
tion to consider; however, the relationship of the BOCs to AT&T 
and the federal government's unsuccessful antitrust suits create an 
inference of punishment. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the Special Provisions section of the Telecom­
munications Act of 1996 should be considered unconstitutional. 
First, the target of the Special Provisions has been singled out 
through the use of specific, not general terms, as evidenced by the 
language of the Act. Second, the weight of factors consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent suggests that the Special Provisions con­
stitute punishment because the primary aim of that section is not to 
create an objective standard meant to achieve preventive goals. 
Rather, the specificity of the Special Provisions section and the cir­
cumstances surrounding its enactment support the conclusion that 
Congress's primary aim was to designate a group of corporations 
for punishment for alleged antitrust violations that were never ade­
quately resolved judicially. 
Karey P. Pond 
